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Abstract
The shuffled (aka anonymous) model has recently generated significant interest as a candidate dis-
tributed privacy framework with trust assumptions better than the central model but with achievable
error rates smaller than the local model. In this paper, we study pure differentially private protocols in
the shuffled model for summation, a very basic and widely used primitive. Specifically:
• For the binary summation problem where each of n users holds a bit as an input, we give a pure -
differentially private protocol for estimating the number of ones held by the users up to an absolute
error of O(1), and where each user sends O(logn) messages each consisting of a single bit. This
is the first pure protocol in the shuffled model with error o(
√
n) for constant values of .
Using our binary summation protocol as a building block, we give a pure -differentially private
protocol that performs summation of real numbers in [0, 1] up to an absolute error of O(1), and
where each user sends O(log
3 n) messages each consisting of O(log logn) bits.
• In contrast, we show that for any pure -differentially private protocol for binary summation in
the shuffled model having absolute error n0.5−Ω(1), the per user communication has to be at least
Ω(
√
logn) bits. This implies (i) the first separation between the (bounded-communication) multi-
message shuffled model and the central model, and (ii) the first separation between pure and
approximate differentially private protocols in the shuffled model.
Interestingly, over the course of proving our lower bound, we have to consider (a generalization of) the
following question that might be of independent interest: given γ ∈ (0, 1), what is the smallest positive
integer m for which there exist two random variables X0 and X1 supported on {0, . . . ,m} such that
(i) the total variation distance between X0 and X1 is at least 1 − γ, and (ii) the moment generating
functions of X0 and X1 are within a constant factor of each other everywhere? We show that the answer
to this question is m = Θ(
√
log(1/γ)).
∗MIT EECS. Supported at MIT by a Fannie & John Hertz Foundation Fellowship, an MIT Akamai Fellowship, and an NSF
Graduate Fellowship. This work was done while at Google Research.
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1 Introduction
Since its introduction by Dwork et al. [DMNS06, DKM+06], differential privacy (DP) has become widely
popular as a rigorous mathematical definition of privacy. This has led to practical deployments at companies
such as Apple [Gre16, App17], Google [EPK14, Sha14], and Microsoft [DKY17], and in government agencies
such as the United States Census Bureau [Abo18]. The most widely studied setting with DP is the so-called
central model (denoted DPcentral) where an analyzer observes the crude user data but is supposed to release
a differentially private data structure. Many accurate private algorithms have been discovered in the central
model; however, the model is limited when the analyst is not to be trusted with the user data. To remedy
this, the more appealing local model of DP (denoted DPlocal) [KLN
+08] (also [War65]) requires the messages
sent by each user to the analyst to be private. Nevertheless, the local model suffers from large estimation
errors that are known to the be on the order of
√
n, where n is the number of users, for a variety of problems
including summation, the focus of this work [BNO08, CSS12]. This has motivated the study of the shuffled
model of DP (denoted DPshuffled), which is intended as a middle-ground with trust assumptions better than
those of the central model and estimation accuracy better than the local model.
While an analogous setup was first introduced in crytpography by Ishai et al. in their work on cryp-
tography from anonymity [IKOS06], the shuffled model was first proposed for privacy-preserving com-
putations by Bittau et al. [BEM+17] in their Encode-Shuffle-Analyze architecture. In this setup which
is depicted in Figure 1, each user sends (potentially several) messages to a trusted shuffler, who ran-
domly permutes all incoming messages before passing them to the analyst. We will treat the shuffler
as a black box in this work, though we point out that various efficient cryptographic implementations
of the shuffler have been considered, including onion routing, mixnets, third-party servers, and secure
hardware (see, e.g., the discussions in [IKOS06, BEM+17]). The privacy properties of DPshuffled were
first studied, independently, by Erlingsson et al. [EFM+19] and Cheu et al. [CSU+19]. Moreover, sev-
eral recent works have sought to nail down the trade-offs between accuracy, privacy and communication
[CSU+19, BBGN19c, GPV19, BBGN19a, GGK+19, GMPV19, BBGN19b, BC19].
Pure- and Approximate-DP. The two most widely used notions of DP are pure-DP [DMNS06] and
approximate-DP [DKM+06], which we recall next. For any parameters  ≥ 0 and δ ∈ [0, 1], a randomized
algorithm P is (, δ)-DP if for every pair datasets X,X ′ differing on a single user’s data, and for every subset
S of transcripts of P , it is the case that
Pr[P (X) ∈ S] ≤ e · Pr[P (X ′) ∈ S] + δ, (1)
where the probabilities are taken over the randomness in P . The notion of -DP is the special case where
δ is set to 0 in (1); we use the terms pure-DP when δ = 0 and approximate-DP when δ > 0. While δ is
intuitively an upper bound on the probability that an (, δ)-DP algorithm fails to be -DP, this failure event
can in principle be catastrophic, revealing all the user inputs to the analyst. Pure-DP protocols are thus
highly desirable as they guarantee more stringent protections against the leakage of user data. In the central
and local settings, several prior works either obtained pure protocols in regimes where approximate protocols
were previously known, or proved separations between pure and approximate protocols (e.g., [HT10, De12,
NTZ13, SU15, BNS18]).
Summation. A basic primitive in data analytics and machine learning is the summation (aka aggregation)
of inputs held by different users. Indeed, private summation is a critical building block in the emerging area of
federated learning [KMY+16] (see also [KMA+19] for a recent extensive overview), where a machine learning
model, say a neural network, is to be trained on data held by many users without having the users send
their data over to a central analyzer. To do so, private variants of Stochastic Gradient Descent have been
developed and their privacy/accuracy trade-offs analyzed (e.g., [ACG+16]). The gist of these procedures is
the private summation of users’ gradient updates. Private summation is also closely related to functions in
the widely studied class of counting queries (e.g., [Vad17, BLR08, HT10, HR10, NTZ13]).
Several recent work studied approximate-DPshuffled protocols for summation [CSU
+19, BBGN19c, GPV19,
BBGN19a, GMPV19, BBGN19b, BC19]. For binary summation, Cheu et al. [CSU+19] show that the stan-
dard randomized response is an (, δ)-DPshuffled protocol for binary summation and that it incurs an ab-
solute error of only O(
√
log n) for constant  and δ inverse polynomial in n. For real summation in the
1
single-message shuffled model (denoted DP1shuffled), where each user sends a single message to the shuffler,
Balle et al. [BBGN19c] show that the tight error for approximate protocols is Θ(n1/6). For real summation
in the multi-message shuffled model (denoted DP≥1shuffled), where a user can send more than one message, the
state-of-the-art approximate protocol was recently obtained in [GMPV19, BBGN19b] and it incurs error at
most O(1/) with every user sending O(1 + log(1/δ)logn ) messages of O(log n) bits each.
The aforementioned protocols, along with several other results (including the work on “privacy amplifi-
cation by shuffling” of Erlingsson et al. [EFM+19] and Balle et al. [BBGN19c]), demonstrate the power of
the shuffled model over the local model in terms of privacy, as any (, o(1/n))-DPlocal summation protocol
must incur an error of Ω(
√
n) [CSS12]. However, all of the protocols proposed so far in the shuffled model
only achieve an advantage over the local model when allowed approximation. This leads us to the following
fundamental and perplexing question that is the focus of our work:
Question 1. Are there pure-DPshuffled protocols that achieve better utility than any DPlocal protocol?
1.1 Main Results
We positively answer the above question for the problem of summation. Namely, we give the first pure-
DPshuffled protocol for binary summation with error depending only on  but independent of n and with
logarithmic communication per user.
Theorem 2 (Pure Binary Summation via Shuffling). For every positive real number , there is a
(non-interactive) -DPshuffled protocol for binary summation that has expected error O(1) and where each
user sends O(log n) messages each consisting of a single bit.
We use the protocol in Theorem 2 as a building block in order to also obtain a protocol with constant
error and polylogarithmic communication per user for the more general task of real summation where each
user input is a real number in [0, 1].
Theorem 3 (Pure Real Summation via Shuffling). For every positive real number , there is a (non-
interactive) -DPshuffled protocol for real summation that has expected error O(1) and where each user sends
O(log
3 n) messages each consisting of O(log log n) bits.
In light of Theorem 2, a natural question is if there is a (non-interactive) pure-DP protocol for binary
summation with logarithmic (or even constant) error and constant communication per user, as in the ap-
proximate case. We show that no such protocol exists, even for very large (polynomial) errors:
Theorem 4 (Communication Lower Bound). In any non-interactive -DP protocol for binary sum-
mation with expected error at most n0.5−Ω(1), the worst-case per user communication must be Ω(
√
log n)
bits.
1.2 Implications
Our results described above imply new separations between different types of DP protocols (e.g., DPcentral,
DPlocal, DP
1
shuffled, and DP
≥1
shuffled), and also give the first accurate pure-DPshuffled protocol for histograms.
We elaborate on these next.
Pure Local vs Shuffled Protocols. In DPlocal, the tight accuracy for binary summation is known to
be Θ(
√
n) for approximate protocols [War65, BNO08, CSS12]. Our Theorems 2 and 3 give the first pure-
DPshuffled protocols with error o(
√
n) for binary and real summation respectively, and in fact they only incur
constant error for both of these problems. Furthermore, Bun et al. [BNS18] gave a generic transformation
from any approximate-DPlocal protocol to a pure-DPlocal protocol with essentially the same accuracy and each
user communicates only O(log log n) bits. In contrast, our Theorem 4 implies that in any such transformation
in the shuffled model (if one exists), the per user communication has to be Ω(
√
log n).
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Pure vs Approximate Shuffled Protocols. Cheu et al. [CSU+19] showed that the standard randomized
response [War65] is an approximate-DP protocol for binary summation that incurs only logarithmic error (for
constant , and δ inverse polynomial in n), and where each user sends a single bit. In contrast, our Theorem 4
implies that the communication cost of any pure-DP protocol for binary summation with logarithmic error
(and in fact with error as large as n0.5−Ω(1)) is Ω(
√
log n) bits. Put together, these two results imply the first
separation between the communication complexity of pure-DPshuffled and approximate-DPshuffled protocols.
Pure Single-Message vs Multi-Message Shuffled Protocols. As recently shown by [BC19], any
pure-DP1shuffled protocol implies a pure-DPlocal protocol with the same accuracy. This implies that any pure-
DP1shuffled protocol for binary summation must incur error Ω(
√
n). Our Theorem 2 thus implies a huge
separation of Θ(
√
n) between the errors possible for pure-DP1shuffled and pure-DP
≥1
shuffled protocols.
Multi-Message Shuffled vs Central Protocols. It is well-known that the tight error for binary sum-
mation in DPcentral is O(1/) [DMNS06]. Theorem 4 proves that any DPshuffled protocol with per user
communication o(
√
log n) bits must incur error n0.5−Ω(1). It thereby gives the first separation between
(bounded-communication) DP≥1shuffled and DPcentral protocols. Indeed the technique used to prove Theorem 4
is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to separate the accuracy of (bounded-communication) DP≥1shuffled
protocols from those of DPcentral protocols with the same privacy parameters (all previous lower bounds in
the shuffled model [CSU+19, BBGN19c, GGK+19] only apply to single-message protocols).
Pure Protocol for Histograms. Our pure binary summation protocol (Theorem 2) implies as a black-
box the first pure-DP protocol with polylogarithmic error for computing histograms (aka point functions or
frequency estimation), albeit with very large communication (see Appendix A for more details). It remains
a very interesting open question to obtain a communication-efficient and accurate pure-DP protocol for
histograms (see Section 6 for more on this and other open questions).
1.3 Overview of Techniques
Binary Summation Protocol. We first explain why all existing summation protocols in the shuffled
model with error o(
√
n) are not O(1)-DP. First, note that as observed by [BC19], any pure-DP1shuffled protocol
implies a pure-DPlocal protocol with the same accuracy and privacy. Combined with the fact that any O(1)-
DPlocal protocol for summation must have error Ω(
√
n), this implies the same lower bound for any pure
O(1)-DP1shuffled protocol. In particular, this rules out the binary randomized response [War65] that was
analyzed in the shuffled model by [CSU+19]. It also rules out the protocol implied by shuffling RAPPOR
[EPK14], and more generally any protocol obtained by the amplification via shuffling approach of [EFM+19,
BBGN19c]. Moreover, in the multi-message shuffled setup, the state-of-the-art real summation protocols of
[GMPV19, BBGN19b], which rely on the Split-and-Mix procedure [IKOS06], only give approximate-DP.
A different DP≥1shuffled protocol for binary summation can be obtained by instantiating the recent DP
≥1
shuffled
protocols for computing histograms [GGK+19], with a domain size of B = 2. On a high-level, the two result-
ing protocols—one of which is based on the Count Min sketch and the other on the Hadamard response—can
be seen as special cases of the following common template: each user (i) samples a number ρ of messages
that depend on their input, (ii) independently samples a number η of noise messages, and (iii) sends these
ρ+ η messages to the shuffler. Loosely, the analyzer then outputs the number of messages “consistent with”
the queried input. However, it can be seen that any protocol following this template will not be pure-DP,
as the supports of the distribution of the count observed at the analyzer can shift by 1 when a single user
input is changed. The crucial insight in our pure protocol for binary summation will be to correlate the
input-dependent messages and the noise messages sampled by each user in steps (i) and (ii) above. By doing
so, we not only aim to ensure that the supports are identical but that the two densities are also within a
small multiplicative factor on any point. We implement this idea using binary messages by having each user
send d bits on both inputs 0 and 1. Specifically, the user will start by flipping a suitably biased coin. If
it lands as head, the user will send (d + 1)/2 zeros and (d − 1)/2 ones when the input is 0, and vice versa
when the input is 1. If the coin lands as tail, the user will sample an integer z from a truncated discrete
Laplace distribution and send z zeros and d − z ones (see Algorithm 1 and Equation (2) for more details).
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Algorithm 1 Randomizer for binary summation.
1: procedure BinaryRandomizer,n(x)
2: Let p, d, s be as in Lemma 9 (depending on , n)
3: a← Ber(p)
4: if a = 0 then
5: if x = 0 then
6: return the multiset with
(
d−1
2
)
ones and
(
d+1
2
)
zeros
7: else
8: return the multiset with
(
d+1
2
)
ones and
(
d−1
2
)
zeros
9: else
10: z ← DLapd(d/2, s)
11: return the multiset with z ones and (d− z) zeros
Algorithm 2 Analyzer for binary summation.
1: procedure BinaryAnalyzer,n(R)
2: Let d be as in Lemma 9 (depending on , n)
3: return n2 +
∑
y∈R
(
y − 12
)
The overall (mixture) distributions of transmitted ones under both zero and one inputs are superimposed in
Figure 2 (in log scale). The analyzer (Algorithm 2) then outputs the number of received ones after debiasing.
Note that the number of ones received by the analyzer is a random variable taking values between 0 and
dn inclusive. To prove that the algorithm is private, we intuitively wish to argue that the noise distribution
satisfies the property that its density values on any two adjacent points are within a multiplicative e factor.
However, the technical challenge stems from the fact that this noise distribution depends on the specific
input sequence (and as we discussed above this dependence is necessary!). Instead, we have to analyze the
n-fold convolution of the individual responses, and show that the density values of the resulting distribution
on any two adjacent points in {0, 1, . . . , dn} are within a multiplicative factor of e, for any input sequence.
The crux of the proof is to relate the tails of different convolutions of the truncated discrete Laplace distri-
bution (Lemmas 10 and 11). We determine a setting of (i) the mixture probability coefficient (denoted by
p in Algorithm 1), (ii) the parameter d, and (iii) the “inverse scaling coefficient” of the truncated discrete
Laplace distribution (denoted by s in Algorithm 1), for which the privacy property holds and for which the
resulting expected absolute error is O(1).
We point out that the dependence of the error on  that we obtain is O˜(1/3/2) for  ≤ O(1) (see Theorem 8
for more details). An interesting open question is whether this dependence can be further reduced to O(1/),
which is the tight error in the central model [DMNS06].
Real Summation Protocol. We use our pure private binary summation protocol outlined above as
a building block in order to obtain a pure private real summation protocol and prove Theorem 3. We
note that Cheu et al. [CSU+19] had given a transformation from binary summation to real summation,
but their reduction results in a protocol with a very large communication of Ω˜(
√
n) bits in order to achieve
logarithmic error. We instead give a (different) transformation that results in a protocol with polylogarithmic
communication. The high-level idea of our reduction is the following: consider the binary representation of
the inputs after rounding them to O(log n) bits of precision, then approximate the sum for each bit position
independently, and finally combine the estimates into an approximation of the (real-valued) sum of the
inputs. Since the bit sum estimates have geometrically decreasing weights, we can afford to increase the
error on less significant bits. In terms of privacy, this means that for the jth most significant bit, we run
an j-DP binary summation protocol where 1, 2, . . . is a decreasing sequence. The protocol is illustrated
in Algorithms 3 and 4. By carefully choosing the sequence 1, 2, . . . , we can ensure that the total pure
privacy parameter
∑
j j is small, while the total error is a constant times the error for the sum of the most
significant bits of the inputs. Intuitively, choosing 1, 2, . . . to be a geometrically decreasing sequence (e.g.,
j =
0.9j ·
10 ) should suffice for our purposes. However since the communication complexity of our binary
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Algorithm 3 Randomizer for real summation.
1: procedure RealRandomizer(j)j∈N,n(x)
2: for j = 1 to 2 log n do
3: x[j]← jth most significant bit of x
4: Sj ←BinaryRandomizerj ,n(x[j]) Sj is a multiset of zeros and ones.
5: Rj ← {j} × Sj Rj is a multiset of tuples (j, 0) and (j, 1).
6: return
⋃2 logn
j=1 Rj
Algorithm 4 Analyzer for real summation.
1: procedure RealAnalyzer(j)j∈N,n(R)
2: for j = 1 to 2 log2 n do
3: Rj ← {y1 | y ∈ R and y0 = j} Multiset of bit messages for the jth bit.
4: aj ←BinaryAnalyzerj ,n(Rj)
5: return
∑2 logn
j=1 aj/2
j
summation protocol also depends on the privacy parameter , such a choice of the sequence would result in
poly(n) communication complexity. To overcome this, our actual sequence has a “cut-off” so that the j ’s
do not go below a certain value. Please see Section 5 for more details.
Lower Bound. We next outline the proof of Theorem 4. Without loss of generality, we consider an
arbitrary -DPshuffled protocol performing binary summation with error n
0.5−Ω(1), and where every user
sends m messages each belonging to the domain {1, . . . , k}. We wish to lower bound the number of bits of
communication per user in this protocol, which is equal to m log k. We denote by X0 and X1 the random
multisets of messages sent by a user in this protocol under inputs 0 and 1 respectively. Note that X0 and X1
are supported on the set ∆k,m := {(z1, . . . , zk) ∈ Zk≥0 | z1 + · · ·+ zk = m}. Here, zi captures the number
of i messages sent by the user for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Using the pure privacy of the protocol, we can argue that the ratio of the moment generating functions
(MGFs) of X0 and X1 cannot take a very large or a very small value. Specifically, using the fact that the
MGF of a sum of independent random variables is equal to the product of the individual MGFs, we derive a
simple yet powerful property that should be satisfied by any -DP protocol in the shuffled model: the ratio of
the MGFs of X0 and X1 should always lie in the interval [e−, e]. We will refer to such random variables as
having an e-bounded MGF ratio (see Section 4.1 for more details). We remark that while MGFs have been
used before in DP by Abadi et al. [ACG+16] and subsequent works on Renyi DP (starting from [Mir17]),
these usages are in a completely different context compared to ours. In particular, these prior works keep
track of the moments in order to bound the privacy parameters under composition of protocols. To the best
of our knowledge, MGFs have neither been used in lower bounds for DP nor in the shuffled model before.
Then, using the accuracy of the protocol, we can deduce that the total variation distance between X0
and X1 has to be large. We do so by invoking a result from the literature [CSS12, GGK+19] showing that
for any binary summation protocol that incurs an absolute error of α, the total variation distance between
X0 and X1 must be at least 1 − Θ(α/√n) (see Theorem 23 for more details). Since α = n0.5−Ω(1) in our
case, we get a lower bound of 1− n−Ω(1) on the total variation distance between X0 and X1.
Equipped with these two ingredients, the task of lower bounding the per user communication cost of the
protocol reduces to lower bounding the following quantity:
Definition 5. Given parameters  > 0 and γ ∈ [0, 1], we define C,γ as the minimum value of m log k for
which there exist two random variables supported on ∆k,m that are at total variation distance is at least 1−γ
but that have an e-bounded MGF ratio.
Note that any lower bound on the value of C,γ can be used to infer a lower bound on the per user commu-
nication cost. In order to prove Theorem 4, and given our setting of γ = 1/nΩ(1), it is thus enough for us to
show that C,γ ≥ Ω(
√
log(1/γ)). To prove this bound, it suffices to show that if two random variables X0,X1
have an e-bounded MGF ratio, then their total variation distance must be at least 1 − exp(O(m2 log k)).
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For each x ∈ ∆k,m, we view Pr[X0 = x] and Pr[X1 = x] as variables. The e-bounded MGF ratio constraints
can then be written as infinitely many linear inequalities over these variables. Moreover, the total variation
distance between X0 and X1 can be written as a maximum of linear combinations of these same variables.
We therefore get a linear program with infinitely many constraints, and we would like to show that any
solution to it has “cost” (i.e., total variation distance) at least 1− exp(O(m2 log k)). We do so by giving a
dual solution with cost at most 1− exp(O(m2 log k)), which by weak duality implies our desired bound (see
Section 4 for more details).
A natural question is if the lower bound C,γ ≥ Ω(
√
log(1/γ)) outlined above can be improved, as that
would immediately lead to an improved communication complexity lower bound. However, we show that the
lower bound is tight, even in the special case where k = 2. Namely, we give two random variables supported
on ∆2,m with m = Θ(
√
log(1/γ)) that are at total variation distance at least 1 − γ but that have an e-
bounded MGF ratio. Our construction is based on truncations of discrete Gaussian random variables (see
Section 4.3 for more details). We note that this limitation only applies to the approach of lower bounding
the per user communication complexity via lower bounding C,γ . It remains possible that other approaches
might give better lower bounds. For instance, one might be able to proceed by giving a necessary condition
for the accuracy of binary summation protocols that is stronger than the total variation distance bound that
we used, or a necessary condition for pure privacy that is better than our e-bounded MGF ratio property.
1.4 Organization
We start with some notation and background in Section 2. Our protocol for binary summation is presented
and analyzed in Section 3. In Section 4, we prove our lower bound (Theorem 4). Our protocol for real
summation appears in Section 5. We conclude with some interesting open questions in Section 6. Our
corollary for histograms appears in Appendix A, and deferred proofs appear in Appendices B, C, and D.
2 Preliminaries
Shuffled Model of Privacy. We denote by n the number of users. For each i in [n] := {1, . . . , n}, we
denote by xi the input held by the ith user, and further assume that xi ∈ X . In the binary summation
case, we have that X = {0, 1} while in the real summation case, we let X be the set [0, 1] of real numbers.
A protocol P = (R,S,A) in the shuffled model consists of three algorithms: (i) the local randomizer R(·)
whose input is the data of one user and whose output is a sequence of messages, (ii) the shuffler S(·) whose
input is the concatenation of the outputs of the local randomizers and whose output is a uniform random
permutation of its inputs, and (iii) the analyzer A(·) whose input is the output of the shuffler and whose
output is the output of the protocol. An illustration of the shuffled model is given in Figure 1. The privacy
in the shuffled model is guaranteed with respect to the input to the analyzer, i.e., the output of the shuffler.
Definition 6 (DP in the shuffled model, [EFM+19, CSU+19]). A protocol P = (R,S,A) is (, δ)-DPshuffled
if, for any dataset X = (x1, . . . , xn), the algorithm S(R(x1), . . . , R(xn)) is (, δ)-DP. In the special case
where δ = 0, we say that the protocol P is -DPshuffled.
Note that the DPlocal model corresponds to the case where S is replaced by the identity function.
Definition 7 (Non-Interactive Protocols). Let k and m be positive integers, and let ∆k,m := {(z1, . . . , zk) ∈
Zk≥0 | z1 + · · · + zk = m}. In a non-interactive (aka one-round) protocol, each of the n users (i.e.,
randomizers) receives an input b and outputs at most m messages each consisting of log k bits, according to
a certain distribution (depending on b), and using private randomness. We say that such a protocol has a
communication complexity of m log k.
It is often convenient to view each message as a number in [k]. We use Xb ∈ Zk≥0 to denote the random
variable whose sth coordinate Xbs denotes the number of s-messages output by the randomizer on input b.
Note that it is always the case that
∑
s∈[k]X
b
s = m, i.e., supp(X
b) ⊆ ∆k,m.
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Figure 1: In the shuffled model, the inputs are first locally randomized, yielding a number of messages that are sent
to the shuffler. The shuffler then randomly permutes all incoming messages before passing them to the analyzer.
This figure is reproduced from [GGK+19].
3 Pure Binary Summation Protocol via Shuffling
In this section we prove Theorem 2, restated formally below.
Theorem 8. For every sufficiently large n and O(1) ≥  > 1/n2/3, there is an -DPshuffled protocol for
summation for inputs x1, . . . , xn ∈ {0, 1} where each user sends O
(
logn

)
one-bit messages to the analyzer
and has expected error at most O
(√
log 1/
3/2
)
.
We remark that the assumption that  > 1
n2/3
is made without loss of generality, because, for  ≤ 1
n2/3
,
there is a trivial algorithm that achieves square error of O(1/3/2): the analyzer just always outputs 0.
Throughout this section we assume that for some absolute constant C,  ≤ C, and thus in particular e
can be bounded above by an absolute constant. (The constant C can be arbitrary.) It is well-known that
any -DPcentral protocol for summation has error Ω(1/) [Vad17]. Thus the error in Theorem 8 is suboptimal
by a factor of at most O˜(1/
√
).
The remainder of the section is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, we present the protocol used to prove
Theorem 8. In Section 3.2, we prove the accuracy and privacy guarantees of Theorem 8, and in Section 3.3
we prove a technical lemma needed in the privacy analysis.
3.1 The Protocol
To described the protocol, let us recall the discrete Laplace (aka symmetric Geometric) distribution. For
notational convenience, we identify the discrete Laplace distribution by two parameters: the mean µ and
the “inverse scaling exponent” s > 1. The discrete Laplace distribution associated with these parameters,
denoted by DLap(µ, s), has the following probability mass function: for z ∈ Z,
Pr
Z∼DLap(µ,s)
[Z = z] =
1
C(µ, s)
· e−|z−µ|/s,
where C(µ, s) =
∑∞
z=−∞ e
−|z−µ|/s is the normalization factor.
We will use the truncated version of the discrete Laplace distribution, for which we condition the support
to be on [µ − w/2, µ + w/2] where w ≥ 1 is the “width” of the support. We denote such a distribution by
DLapw(µ, s). In other words, its probability mass function satisfies
Pr
Z∼DLapw(µ,s)
[Z = z] =
{
1
Cw(µ,s)
· e−|z−µ|/s if µ− w/2 ≤ z ≤ µ+ w/2 and z ∈ Z
0 otherwise.
(2)
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Figure 2: An illustration of the probability mass functions of the number of ones output by the randomizer (Al-
gorithm 1) for parameter d = 31, s = 0.5, p = 0.01. The x-axis corresponds to the number of ones and the y-axis
corresponds to the base-2 logarithm of the probability. The red points and the blue points correspond to when the
input is one and zero respectively.
Once again Cw(µ, s) =
∑
z∈[µ−w/2,µ+w/2]∩Z e
−|z−µ|/s is simply the normalization factor.
Our randomizer and analyzer are presented in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, respectively. The protocol
has 3 parameters: the number of messages d, the “inverse scaling exponent” s, and the “noise probability”
p. We always assume that d is a positive odd integer1. These parameters will be chosen later (in Lemma 9).
3.2 Privacy Analysis
For b ∈ {0, 1}, we write Rb to denote the distribution2 on the number of ones output by the randomizer
on input b. (This distribution depends on d, s, p but we do not include them in the notation to avoid being
cumbersome.) Notice that we can decompose Rb as a mixture p ·DLapd(d/2, s) + (1− p) · 1(d−12 + b), where
we use 1(ϑ) to denote the distribution that is ϑ with probability 1.
To prove the privacy guarantee of Theorem 8, we first note that we may focus only on the neighboring
datasets (0, . . . , 0, 0) and (0, . . . , 0, 1); this follows since we may assume (due to symmetry) that more than
half of the bits are zero and we can then condition out the results from the 1 bits that they share. (See the
proof of Theorem 8 for a formalization of this.) For these datasets, Lemma 9 below bounds the ratio of the
probabilities of ending up with a particular union of outputs from these two datasets.
1We only assume that d is odd for convenience, so that
(
d−1
2
)
and
(
d+1
2
)
are integers. Using an even d and replacing these
two quantities with d/2− 1 and d/2 + 1 also works, provided that the proofs are adjusted appropriately.
2This is the distribution of Xb defined in Section 2.
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Lemma 9. There is a sufficiently small constant c0 ∈ (0, 1) so that the following holds. For any sufficiently
large n ∈ N and any c0 ≥  > 1n2/3 , let s = 10 , p =
100 e100 log(1/(1−e−0.1))
n(1−e−0.1) , and d = 4
⌈
1000 e100
(1−e−0.1) · log
(
n
1−e−0.1
)⌉
+
3. Then, we have
PrZ1,...,Zn∼R0 [Z1 + · · ·+ Zn = t]
PrZ1,...,Zn−1∼R0,Zn∼R1 [Z1 + · · ·+ Zn = t]
∈ [e−, e], (3)
for all t ∈ {0, . . . , dn}.
This means that, for the above selection of parameters, the protocol is -DP. Using Lemma 9, we prove
Theorem 8.
Proof of Theorem 8. We may assume without loss of generality that  ≤ c0, as otherwise we may set  to
min{, c0} instead.
We use the local randomizerBinaryRandomizer,n of Algorithm 1 and the analyzerBinaryAnalyzer,n
of Algorithm 2, with the parameters s, d, p given by the expressions in Lemma 9, except with n replaced by
d(n+1)/2e. Explicitly, we have s = 10 , p = 100 e
100 log(1/(1−e−0.1))
d(n+1)/2e(1−e−0.1) and d = 4
⌈
1000 e100
(1−e−0.1) · log
(
d(n+1)/2e
1−e−0.1
)⌉
+
3. We prove the accuracy guarantee first, which is a simple consequence of the choices of p, d made in Lemma
9, followed by the privacy guarantee, which uses Lemma 9.
Proof of accuracy. Fix a dataset X = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n. Let Y ∈ R be the count released by
the analyzer. Moreover, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let Z1, . . . , Zn be i.i.d. random variables distributed according to
ν = DLapd(d/2, s). It is easy to check that Var[Zi] ≤ 2s2. Moreover, let M ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} be the number of
users for whom the Bernoulli random variable a is equal to 1. In particular, M ∼ Binom(n, p). The expected
absolute error is given by
E
[∣∣∣∣∣Y −
n∑
i=1
xi
∣∣∣∣∣
]
≤
n∑
m=0
Pr[M = m] ·
(
m
2
+ E
[∣∣∣∣Z1 + · · ·+ Zm − md2
∣∣∣∣])
(by Jensen’s inequality) ≤ E[M/2] +
n∑
m=0
Pr[M = m] ·
√√√√E[(Z1 + · · ·+ Zm − md
2
)2]
≤ pn/2 +
n∑
m=0
Pr[M = m] ·
√√√√√E
 m∑
j=1
(Zi − d/2)2

(since Z1, . . . , Zn are iid) = pn/2 +
n∑
m=0
Pr[M = m] · √m ·
√
Var[Z1]
≤ pn/2 +
n∑
m=0
Pr[M = m] · √m ·
√
2s2
= pn/2 +
√
2s · E[
√
M ]
≤ pn/2 +
√
2s · √pn. (4)
Since p = 100 e
100 log(1/(1−e−0.1))
d(n+1)/2e(1−e−0.1) , we have pn/2 +
√
2pn · s = O
(√
log 1/
3/2
)
. Combined with (4), this gives
us the desired upper bound on the expected error of the protocol.
Proof of privacy. Let X = (x1, . . . , xn−1, xn) ∈ {0, 1}n and X ′ = (x1, . . . , xn−1, x′n) ∈ {0, 1}n be two
neighboring datasets. By symmetry, without loss of generality, we may assume that xn = 0 and at least
n0 := dn−1e/2 of the values of x1, . . . , xn−1 are also 0. By permuting the users, we may also assume without
loss of generality that x1 = x2 = · · · = xn0 = 0. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let Yi ∈ [0, d] denote the (random) number
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of 1s output by user i when their input is xi. Also let Y
′
n ∈ [0, 1] denote the (random) number of 1’s output
by user n when its input is x′n. By [BBGN19c, Lemma A.2], to show that for all t ∈ N,
Pr[Y1 + · · ·+ Yn−1 + Yn = t]
Pr[Y1 + · · ·+ Yn−1 + Y ′n = t]
∈ [e−, e],
it suffices to show that for all t0 ∈ N,
Pr[Y1 + · · ·+ Yn0 + Yn = t0]
Pr[Y1 + · · ·+ Yn0 + Y ′n = t0]
∈ [e−, e]. (5)
Now the validity of (5) is an immediate consequence of Lemma 9 with the parameter n of Lemma 9 equal
to n0 + 1.
From now on, we will use ν and ωb as abbreviations for DLapd(d/2, s) and 1(
d−1
2 + b) respectively, where
d, s are defined as in Lemma 9.
Let us denote by Pm,k the probability that m independent random variables from the noise distribution
ν sums up to k; more formally,
Pm,k := Pr
Z1,...,Zm∼ν
[Z1 + · · ·+ Zm = k].
For convenience, we define P0,0 = 1 and P0,k = 0 for all k 6= 0.
As we will see in the proof of Lemma 9 below, expansions of the numerator and denominator of the left
hand side of (3) result in similar terms involving Pm,k, except occasionally with (i) k differing by one or (ii)
m differing by 1 and k differing by
(
d−1
2
)
or
(
d−3
2
)
. Hence, to bound the ratio between the two, we have
to find some relation between Pm,k, Pm,k−1, Pm+1,k+( d−12 ), and Pm+1,k+( d−32 ). The exact inequality we will
use here is stated below and proved in Section 3.3.
Lemma 10. For any sufficiently large n ∈ N, let , d and s be as in Lemma 9. Then the following hold: For
any integers 10 log(1/(1−e
−0.1))
1−e−0.1 ≤ m ≤ n− 1, and `1, `2 ∈
{
d−1
2 ,
d−3
2
}
, if p ≥ 100 e100n(1−e−0.1) , then we have
e−p(1− e−/2) ·
(
Pm+1,k+`1 +
(n−m− 1)
m+ 1
· Pm+1,k+`2
)
+ e0.2 · Pm,k−1 ≥ Pm,k. (6)
We prove Lemma 10 in Section 3.3.3. We additionally need the following Lemma 11, which can be
interpreted as a sort of anti-concentration result. Recall that Pi,j = Pr[Z1 + · · ·+Zi = j], where Z1, . . . , Zi ∼
ν = DLapd(d/2, s). For any a ∈ N, if also Z ′1, . . . , Z ′a ∼ ν, then as E[Z ′1 + · · · + Z ′a] = da/2 and the
distribution of Z ′1 + · · · + Z ′a has sufficient mass at its expectation, one should expect that Pi+a,j+a =
Pr[Z1 + · · ·+ Zi + Z ′1 + · · ·+ Z ′a = j + da/2] is not too much smaller than Pi,j . Lemma 11 says that in fact
Pr[Z1 + · · ·+ Zi + Z ′1 + · · ·+ Z ′a = j + da/2− d/2] is not too much smaller than Pi,j .
Lemma 11. For any i, j, a ∈ N0 such that a ≤ s2/1000, we have
Pi+a,j+a( d−12 )
≥
√
a
40s3
· Pi,j .
The proof of Lemma 11 is deferred to Section B.1. We note that the multiplicative factor on the right
hand side of the above lemma is unimportant; in fact, as long as it is 1/sO(1), it suffices for our proof.
With Lemmas 10 and 11 ready, we can now prove Lemma 9 as follows.
Proof of Lemma 9. Let c0 ∈ (0, 1) be some sufficiently small positive constant, to be specified later. We
would like to show that, for all t ∈ {0, . . . , dn}, the following two inequalities hold:
Pr
Z1,...,Zn∼R0
[Z1 + · · ·+ Zn = t] ≤ e · Pr
Z1,...,Zn−1∼R0,Zn∼R1
[Z1 + · · ·+ Zn = t], (7)
and
Pr
Z1,...,Zn−1∼R0,Zn∼R1
[Z1 + · · ·+ Zn = t] ≤ e · Pr
Z1,...,Zn∼R0
[Z1 + · · ·+ Zn = t]. (8)
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Proof of (7). We will start by showing (7). To do so, let us first decompose the probability on the left
and the right hand sides based on whether Zn is sampled from the noise distribution ν. This gives
Pr
Z1,...,Zn∼R0
[Z1 + · · ·+ Zn = t]
= p · Pr
Z1,...,Zn−1∼R0,Zn∼ν
[Z1 + · · ·+ Zn = t]
+ (1− p) · Pr
Z1,...,Zn−1∼R0
[
Z1 + · · ·+ Zn−1 = t−
(
d− 1
2
)]
, (9)
and
Pr
Z1,...,Zn−1∼R0,Zn∼R1
[Z1 + · · ·+ Zn = t]
= p · Pr
Z1,...,Zn−1∼R0,Zn∼ν
[Z1 + · · ·+ Zn = t]
+ (1− p) · Pr
Z1,...,Zn−1∼R0
[
Z1 + · · ·+ Zn−1 = t−
(
d+ 1
2
)]
. (10)
Furthermore, observe that, by expanding based on the number of variables among Z1, . . . , Zn−1 that uses
the noise distribution (i.e., i below), we have
Pr
Z1,...,Zn−1∼R0,Zn∼ν
[Z1 + · · ·+ Zn = t] =
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
pi(1− p)n−1−i · Pi+1,t−(n−1−i)( d−12 ), (11)
and
Pr
Z1,...,Zn−1∼R0
[
Z1 + · · ·+ Zn−1 = t−
(
d− 1
2
)]
=
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
pi(1− p)n−1−i · Pi,t−(n−i)( d−12 ), (12)
and
Pr
Z1,...,Zn−1∼R0
[
Z1 + · · ·+ Zn−1 = t−
(
d+ 1
2
)]
=
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
pi(1− p)n−1−i · Pi,t−(n−i)( d−12 )−1. (13)
We may expand the right hand side of (13) further as
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
pi(1− p)n−1−i · Pi,t−(n−i)( d−12 )−1
=
1
e
·
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
pi(1− p)n−1−i · e/2 · Pi,t−(n−i)( d−12 )−1
+
1
e
·
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
pi(1− p)n−1−i · (e − e/2)Pi,t−(n−i)( d−12 )−1
≥ 1
e
·
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
pi(1− p)n−1−i · e/2 · Pi,t−(n−i)( d−12 )−1
+
1
e
·
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
pi(1− p)n−1−i · (e/2 − 1)Pi,t−(n−i)( d−12 )−1
≥ 1
e
·
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
pi(1− p)n−1−i · e/2 · Pi,t−(n−i)( d−12 )−1
+
1
e
·
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i+ 1
)
pi+1(1− p)n−2−i · (e/2 − 1)Pi+1,t−(n−i−1)( d−12 )−1
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≥ 1
e
·
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
pi(1− p)n−1−ie/2 · Pi,t−(n−i)( d−12 )−1
+
1
e
·
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
pi(1− p)n−1−i · p(n− 1− i)
i+ 1
· (e/2 − 1)Pi+1,t−(n−i−1)( d−12 )−1. (14)
Using the above expressions, we may write the difference between the right hand side and the left hand
side of (7) as
e · Pr
Z1,...,Zn−1∼R0,Zn∼R1
[Z1 + · · ·+ Zn = t]− Pr
Z1,...,Zn∼R0
[Z1 + · · ·+ Zn = t]
≥ (e − 1) · p ·
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
pi(1− p)n−1−i · Pi+1,t−(n−1−i)( d−12 )
+ (1− p) ·
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
pi(1− p)n−1−ie/2 · Pi,t−(n−i)( d−12 )−1
+ (1− p) ·
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
pi(1− p)n−1−i · p(n− 1− i)
i+ 1
· (e/2 − 1)Pi+1,t−(n−i−1)( d−12 )−1
− (1− p) ·
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
pi(1− p)n−1−i · Pi,t−(n−i)( d−12 )
≥ (1− p)
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
pi(1− p)n−1−i∆i, (15)
where
∆i := p(1− e−/2) ·
(
Pi+1,t−(n−1−i)( d−12 ) +
n− 1− i
i+ 1
· Pi+1,t−(n−i−1)( d−12 )−1
)
+ e/2 · Pi,t−(n−i)( d−12 )−1 − Pi,t−(n−i)( d−12 ),
and we have used that e − 1 ≥ e/2 − 1 ≥ 1− e−/2 for  ≥ 0.
By Lemma 10 with m = i, k = t− (n− i) (d−12 ) , `1 = (d−12 ), and `2 = (d−32 ), we see that
∆i ≥ (e0.3 − 1)Pi,t−(n−i)( d−12 ) ≥ 0, (16)
for all i such that 10 log(1/(1−e
−0.1))
1−e−0.1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1. For ease of notation set i0 := 10 log(1/(1−e
−0.1))
1−e−0.1 . It remains
to lower bound the terms in (15) given by 0 ≤ i < i0. To do so, we will “borrow” the additional mass of
(e0.3 − 1)Pi,t−(n−i)( d−12 ) from the terms with i ≥ i0. To show that this borrowing gives sufficient positive
mass from the terms Pi,t−(n−i)( d−12 ) with i ≥ i0, we will use Lemma 11.
Next, let imax ∈ {0, 1, . . . , i0 − 1} and imin ∈ {i0, i0 + 1, . . . , 2p(n− 1)} be defined so that:
Pimax,t−(n−imax)( d−12 ) ≥ Pi,t−(n−i)( d−12 ) ∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , i0 − 1}
Pimin,t−(n−imin)( d−12 ) ≤ Pi,t−(n−i)( d−12 ) ∀i ∈ {i0, i0 + 1, . . . , 2p(n− 1)}.
As p = 100 e
100 log(1/(1−e−0.1))
n(1−e−0.1) and  < c0 ≤ 1, we have that as long as c0 is sufficiently small,
2p(n− 1) ≤ 100e
100 log(5/)
0.1
≤ 1
42
= s2/1000.
It follows from Lemma 11 with a = imin − imax ≤ 2p(n− 1) that
Pimin,t−(n−imin)( d−12 ) ≥
1
40s3
Pimax,t−(n−imax)( d−12 ).
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Let M ∼ Binom(n− 1, p) be a binomial random variable. Then, as (16) holds for n− 1 ≥ i ≥ i0, we have
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
pi(1− p)n−1−i∆i
≥ −
i0−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
pi(1− p)n−1−iPi,t−(n−i)( d−12 ) +
2p(n−1)∑
i=i0
(
n− 1
i
)
pi(1− p)n−1−i(e0.3 − 1) · Pi,t−(n−i)( d−12 )
≥ −Pimax,t−(n−imax)( d−12 )
i0−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
pi(1− p)n−1−i + 0.3 · Pimin,t−(n−imin)( d−12 )
2p(n−1)∑
i=i0
(
n− 1
i
)
pi(1− p)n−1−i
≥ Pimax,t−(n−imax)( d−12 ) ·
(
0.3
40s3
· Pr[i0 ≤M ≤ 2p(n− 1)]− Pr[M < i0]
)
. (17)
By the Chernoff bound, for sufficiently large n and since pn = n · 100 e100 log(1/(1−e−0.1))n(1−e−0.1) ≥ 100, we have
Pr[M > 2p(n− 1)] ≤ exp(−p(n− 1)/3) ≤ exp(−pn/4) < 1/2.
Moreover, since i0 =
10 log(1/(1−e−0.1))
1−e−0.1 ≤ pn/3 ≤ p(n− 1)/2 and  ≤ 1 in the current case,
Pr[M < i0] ≤ exp(−p(n− 1)/8) ≤ exp(−pn/10) ≤ exp
(
10
1− e−0.1
)
≤ exp(−1/(2)) < 1/4.
Hence, recalling s = 10 , d = 4
⌈
1000 e100
(1−e−0.1) · log
(
n
1−e−0.1
)⌉
+ 3, and p = 100 e
100 log(1/(1−e−0.1))
n(1−e−0.1) (as well as
the assumption  > 1/n2/3),
0.3
40s3
· Pr[i0 ≤M ≤ 2p(n− 1)]− Pr[M < i0]
≥ 0.3
160s3
− exp(−1/(2))
≥ c4 − exp(−1/(2)),
for some sufficiently small positive absolute constant c. The above quantity is positive as long as exp(1/(2)) ≥
1
c4 , i.e., as long as  ≤ c′ for some absolute constant c′ > 0 (which holds as long as we select c0 ≤ c′). From
this and (15), we can conclude that (7) holds.
Proof of (8). Next, we move on to prove (8). Similar to the previous case (specifically (14)), we may
bound the right hand side of (12) further as
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
pi(1− p)n−1−i · Pi,t−(n−i)( d−12 ) (18)
≥ 1
e
·
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
pi(1− p)n−1−ie/2 · Pi,t−(n−i)( d−12 )
+
1
e
·
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
pi(1− p)n−1−i · p(n− 1− i)
i+ 1
· (e/2 − 1)Pi+1,t−(n−i−1)( d−12 ). (19)
Thus, as in (15), we may write the difference between the right hand side and the left hand side of (8) as
e · Pr
Z1,...,Zn∼R0
[Z1 + · · ·+ Zn = t]− Pr
Z1,...,Zn−1∼R0,Zn∼R1
[Z1 + · · ·+ Zn = t]
≥ (1− p)
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
pi(1− p)n−1−i∆˜i, (20)
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where
∆˜i := p(1− e−/2) ·
(
Pi+1,t−(n−1−i)( d−12 ) +
n− 1− i
i+ 1
· Pi+1,t−(n−i−1)( d−12 )
)
+ e/2 · Pi,t−(n−i)( d−12 ) − Pi,t−(n−i)( d−12 )−1.
To see that the expression (20) is non-negative, observe first that, due to symmetry, we have Pi′,j′ = Pi′,di′−j′
for all i′ ∈ Z≥0 and j ∈ Z. In particular,
Pi,t−(n−i)( d−12 ) = Pi,di−(t−(n−i)( d−12 ))
Pi+1,t−(n−1−i)( d−12 ) = Pi+1,di−(t−(n+1−i)( d−12 ))+1.
Using this observation together with Lemma 10 where m = i, k = di− (t− (n− i) (d−12 )− 1) and `1 = `2 =
d−1
2 , we have that
∆˜i ≥ (e0.3 − 1) · Pi,di−(t−(n−i)( d−12 )−1) = (e
0.3 − 1) · Pi,t−(n−i)( d−12 )−1 ≥ 0 (21)
for all i0 =
10 log(1/(1−e−0.1))
1−e−0.1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Using Lemma 11 in a similar manner to the derivation of (17),
we may conclude that for some i˜max ∈ {0, 1, . . . , i0 − 1},
(1−p)
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
pi(1−p)n−1−i∆˜i ≥ Pi˜max,t−(n−i˜max)( d−12 )−1·
(
0.3
40s3
· Pr[i0 ≤M ≤ 2p(n− 1)]− Pr[M < i0]
)
.
The same argument as in the proof of (7) establishes that as long as c0 is chosen small enough, the above
quantity is non-negative. It follows that (8) holds, and hence our proof is completed.
3.3 A Tale of Two Tails: Proof of Lemma 10
In this section we prove several inequalities relating the two tails Pm,∗ and Pm+1,∗, and ultimately prove
Lemma 10. Throughout this section, we will use the several additional notation:
• First, we will overload the notation and use ν(z) to denote the probability mass function of ν at z, i.e.,
ν(z) := PrZ∼ν [Z = z].
• We often represent a sequence of integers a1, . . . , am as a vector a = (a1, . . . , am); boldface is used to
emphasized that the variable is a vector. For such a vector, we use ν(a) as a shorthand for the product
ν(a1) · · · ν(am).
• We use Sm,k,d to denote the set of all sequences of integers a1, . . . , am between 0 and d (inclusive)
whose sum is k; more formally,
Sm,k,d = {(a1, . . . , am) ∈ (Z ∩ [0, d])m | a1 + · · ·+ am = k} = ∆m,k ∩ [0, d]m.
Since d will be fixed throughout, for simplicity of notation, we omit d and simply use Sm,k.
• For a sequence a = (a1, . . . , am), we define zero(a) to be the number of zero coordinates, i.e., zero(a) =
|{i ∈ [m] | ai = 0}|.
• Next, for any i ∈ R, we use Szero<im,k (resp. Szero≥im,k ) to denote the sets of sequences in Sm,k whose
number of zero-coordinates is less than (resp., at least) i. More formally,
Szero<im,k = {a ∈ Sm,k | zero(a) < i},
and
Szero≥im,k = {a ∈ Sm,k | zero(a) ≥ i}.
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Proof Overview. We now give a rough outline of our proof. First, let us observe that we may expand
Pm,k as
Pm,k =
∑
a∈Sm,k
ν(a) =
∑
a∈Szero<im,k
ν(a) +
∑
a∈Szero≥im,k
ν(a),
where i will be chosen later in the proof.
We will bound the two terms on the right separately. More specifically, we will show that∑
a∈Szero<im,k
ν(a) ≤ e0.5 · Pm,k−1, (22)
and that for `1, `2 ∈ {d−12 , d−32 },∑
a∈Szero≥im,k
ν(a) ≤ p(1− e−0.5) ·
(
Pm+1,k+`1 +
(n−m+ 1)
m+ 1
· Pm+1,k+`2
)
. (23)
Once we have these two inequalities, Lemma 10 immediately follows. The intuition behind the two inequali-
ties is quite simple. For (22), since each sequence a ∈ Szero<im,k contains few zeros, we should be able to pick a
non-zero ai and decrease it by one and end up with a sequence in Sm,k−1 instead; since the discrete Laplace
distribution’s mass (i.e., ν) on ai and on ai−1 differs (multiplicatively) by a factor of at most e1/s, the mass
of the modified sequence also differs from the original sequence by a factor of e1/s.
For (23), the intuition is pretty similar. We start with a sequence a ∈ Szero≥im,k and we will modify it to
end up with a sequence in Sm+1,k+` where ` is either
(
d−1
2
)
or
(
d−3
2
)
. The intuition here is that since a
contains many zero coordinates, there are many ways for us to divide ` among these zero coordinates and
an additional coordinate, which would result naturally in a sequence in Pm+1,k+`.
To turn the intuition into a formal proof, we need to be careful about “double counting” a modified
sequence. As an example, for (22), suppose we would like to modify a sequence in Szero<im,k to one in
Sm,k−1 by decreasing any non-zero coordinate. Then, it is possible that two sequences (1, 0, a3, . . . , an)
and (0, 1, a3, . . . , an) results in the same sequence (0, 0, a3, . . . , an).
In order to avoid such “double counting”, we divide our proofs into two parts. First, we show that
we may replace Szero<im,k (resp. S
zero≥i
m,k ) with the set of sequences whose first coordinate is non-zero (resp.,
whose first few coordinates are zeros); this is done in Section 3.3.1. Then, in Section 3.3.2, we apply the
modification step but only to the first (resp., first few) coordinates; this ensures that there is no “double
counting”. Finally, in Section 3.3.3, we put the two components together to deduce Lemma 10.
3.3.1 Bounding Sums by (Non-)Zero Prefix Sums
As stated earlier, we will show in this section that we may replace Szero<im,k (resp., S
zero≥i
m,k ) with the set of
sequences whose first coordinate is non-zero (resp., whose first few coordinates are zeros). In both cases, the
arguments are similar. Roughly speaking, we observe that permutations of coordinates of a results in the
same probability mass. Hence, by taking a random permutation of a sequence, there is a certain probability
that we end up with a sequence with leading non-zero coordinate (resp., zero coordinates).
We can now formalize our bound, starting with that for Szero<im,k . Note that, for a permutation pi : [m]→
[m] and a sequence a ∈ Sm,k, we use pi ◦ a to denote the sequence (api(1), . . . , api(m)).
Lemma 12. For any k ∈ Z and m, i ∈ N such that i ≤ m, we have∑
a∈Szero<im,k
ν(a) ≤ m
m− i+ 1 ·
∑
a′∈Sm,k
a′1 6=0
ν(a′).
Proof. We have
∑
a∈Szero<im,k
ν(a) ≤
∑
a∈Szero<im,k
 1(m− i+ 1) · (m− 1)! · ∑
pi:[m]→[m]
api(1) 6=0
ν(a)

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=
1
(m− i+ 1) · (m− 1)!
∑
a∈Szero<im,k
∑
pi:[m]→[m]
api(1) 6=0
ν(pi ◦ a)
=
1
(m− i+ 1) · (m− 1)!
∑
a′∈Sm,k
a′1=0
ν(a′) ·
∑
a∈Szero<im,k
|{pi | (pi ◦ a) = a′}|
≤ 1
(m− i+ 1) · (m− 1)!
∑
a′∈Sm,k
a′1 6=0
ν(a′) ·m!
≤ m
m− i+ 1
∑
a′∈Sm,k
a′1 6=0
ν(a′).
We next prove our bound for Szero≥im,k . In this case, we upper bound the sum
∑
a∈Szero≥im,k
ν(a) by the sum
over sequences such that the first t coordinates are zeros, where t is a parameter that will be specified later.
Lemma 13. For any k ∈ Z and m, i, t ∈ N such that t ≤ i ≤ m, we have∑
a∈Szero≥im,k
ν(a) ≤ m · · · · (m− t+ 1)
i · · · · (i− t+ 1) · ν(0)
t · Pm−t,k.
Proof. We have
∑
a∈Szero≥im,k
ν(a) ≤
∑
a∈Szero≥im,k
 1i · · · (i− t+ 1) · (m− t)! · ∑
pi:[m]→[m]
api(1)=···=api(t)=0
ν(a)

=
1
i · · · (i− t+ 1) · (m− t)!
∑
a∈Szero≥im,k
∑
pi:[m]→[m]
api(1)=···=api(t)=0
ν(pi ◦ a)
=
1
i · · · (i− t+ 1) · (m− t)!
∑
a′∈Sm,k
a′1=···=a′t=0
ν(a′) ·
∑
a∈Szero≥im,k
|{pi | (pi ◦ a) = a′}|
≤ 1
i · · · (i− t+ 1) · (m− t)!
∑
a′∈Sm,k
a′1=···=a′t=0
ν(a′) ·m!
=
m · · · (m− t+ 1)
i · · · (i− t+ 1)
∑
a′∈Sm,k
a′1=···=a′t0
ν(a′)
=
m · · · · (m− t+ 1)
i · · · · (i− t+ 1) · ν(0)
t · Pm−t,k.
3.3.2 Bounding Sums by Prefix Modification
We now move on to relate the sums derived in the previous sections to the terms that we actually care about
(i.e., Pm,k−1, Pm+1,k+( d−12 ), Pm+1,k+( d−32 )). As describe in the proof overview, this is done by modifying the
first few coordinates of the sequences.
We start with the bound on the sum from Lemma 12. In this case, the modification is simple: just
decrease the first coordinate by one. This is formalized below.
Lemma 14. For any m, k ∈ N, we have ∑
a′∈Sm,k
a′1 6=0
ν(a′) ≤ e1/s · Pm,k−1.
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Proof. We can now further rewrite the right hand side as∑
a′∈Sm,k
a′1 6=0
ν(a′) =
∑
a′1,...,a′m∈Z∩[0,d]
a′1+···+a′m=k,a′1≥1
ν(a′1) · · · ν(a′m)
=
∑
a′′1 ,a′2,...,a′m−1,a′m∈Z∩[0,d]
a′′1 +a′2+···+a′m−1=k−1,a′′1≤d−1
ν(a′′1 + 1)ν(a
′
2) · · · ν(a′m)
≤ e1/s ·
 ∑
a′′1 ,a′2,...,a′m−1,a′m∈Z∩[0,d]
a′′1 +a′2+···+a′m−1=k−1,a′′1≤d−1
ν(a′′1)ν(a
′
2) · · · ν(a′m)

≤ e1/s ·
 ∑
a′′1 ,a′2,...,a′m−1,a′m∈Z∩[0,d]
a′′1 +a′2+···+a′m−1=k−1
ν(a′′1)ν(a
′
2) · · · ν(a′m)

= e1/s · Pm,k−1.
Next, for the right hand side term from Lemma 13, we will simply bound ν(0)t. In this case, the bound
is shown by simply counting the number of possible ways of writing ` (which is either d−12 or
d−3
2 ) as a sum
of t+ 1 non-negative integers, as stated more precisely below.
Lemma 15. Let C = Cd/2(d/2, s). For any t ∈ N and any ` ∈ Z ∩ [0, d/2], we have(
`+t
t
) · e−(d/2−`)/s
C
· ν(0)t = Pt+1,`.
Proof. For any a ∈ St+1,`, we have
ν(a) = ν(a1) · · · ν(at+1)
=
(
1
C
· e−(d/2−a1)/s
)
· · ·
(
1
C
· e−(d/2−at+1)/s
)
=
(
1
C
· e−d/(2s)
)t
·
(
1
C
· e−(d/2−(a1+···+at+1))/s
)
= ν(0)t ·
(
1
C
· e−(d/2−`)/s
)
. (24)
Now, observe that, from a standard star and bar argument, we have |St+1,`| =
(
`+t
t
)
. As a result, we
have
Pt+1,` =
∑
a∈St+1,`
ν(a)
(24)
=
∑
a∈St+1,`
ν(0)t ·
(
1
C
· e−(d/2−`)/s
)
=
(
`+t
t
) · e−(d/2−`)/s
C
· ν(0)t,
as desired.
3.3.3 Putting Things Together: Proof of Lemma 10
With the above four lemmas ready, we can now prove Lemma 10 by picking appropriate values of i, t. To
facilitate our proof, we will also employ the following lemma.
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Lemma 16. For any i, j, i′, j′ ∈ N0, we have
Pi,j · Pi′,j′ ≤ Pi+i,j+j′ .
The proof of Lemma 16 is deferred to Section B.3.
Proof of Lemma 10. Recall that we would like to show:
e−p(1− e−/2) ·
(
Pm+1,k+`1 +
(n−m− 1)
m+ 1
· Pm+1,k+`2
)
+ e0.2 · Pm,k−1 ≥ Pm,k (25)
for all 10 log(1/(1−e
−0.1))
1−e−0.1 ≤ m ≤ n− 1 when p ≥ 100 e
100
n(1−e−0.1) .
Let i = d(1− e0.1) ·me. We may write Pm,k as
Pm,k =
∑
a∈Sm,k
ν(a) =
∑
a∈Szero<im,k
ν(a) +
∑
a∈Szero≥im,k
ν(a). (26)
We will bound the two terms on the right hand side separately.
First term of (26). For the first term (i.e., the sum over a ∈ Szero<im,k ), by applying Lemmas 12 and 14,
we have ∑
a∈Szero<im,k
ν(a) ≤ e1/s · m
m− i+ 1 · Pm,k−1. (27)
Recall that we pick s so that 1/s ≤ 0.1 and i so that mm−i+1 ≤ mm−(1−e−0.1)m = e0.1. Combining these two
inequalities with (27), we have ∑
a∈Szero<im,k
ν(a) ≤ e0.2 · Pm,k−1. (28)
Second term of (26). We now move on to bound the second term on the right hand side of (26). For
this term, we apply Lemma 13 and Lemma 15 with t = min
{
di/2e,
⌈
100 log
(
n
1−e−0.1
)⌉}
. This gives the
following for any ` ∈ {d−12 , d−32 } and 0 ≤ m ≤ n− 1:∑
a∈Szero≥im,k
ν(a) ≤ m · · · · (m− t+ 1)
i · · · · (i− t+ 1) · ν(0)
t · Pm−t,k
≤ m · · · · (m− t+ 1)
i · · · · (i− t+ 1) ·
C(
`+t
t
) · e−(d/2−`)/s · Pt+1,` · Pm−t,k
≤
(
m
i− t+ 1
)t
·
(
t
`
)t
· (C · e(d/2−`)/s) · Pt+1,` · Pm−t,k
≤
(
m
i− t+ 1
)t
·
(
t
`
)t
· (C · e(d/2−`)/s) · Pm+1,k+`, (29)
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 16.
Now, from ` ∈ {d−12 , d−32 } and from Lemma 34, we have
(C · e(d/2−`)/s) ≤ 2
1− e−0.1 · e
3/(2s) =
2e0.15
1− e−0.1 . (30)
Next, from our choice of t = min
{
di/2e,
⌈
100 log
(
n
1−e−0.1
)⌉}
and since d ≥ 4
⌈
1000 e100
(1−e−0.1) · log
(
n
1−e−0.1
)⌉
+
3 holds for all 0 ≤ m ≤ n− 1, we have(
m
i− t+ 1
)t
·
(
t
`
)t
≤
(
m
i/2
)t
·
(
t
`
)t
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(from i ≥ (1− e−0.1)m) ≤
(
2t
(1− e−0.1)`
)t
(from ` ∈ {(d− 1)/2, (d− 3)/2}) ≤
(
2t
(1− e−0.1) (d−32 )
)t
(31)
(from our choice of d) ≤
(
te−100
1000 log(n/(1− e−0.1))
)t
. (32)
Let us now consider two cases, based on whether t =
⌈
100 log
(
n
1−e−0.1
)⌉
.
Case 1: t =
⌈
100 log
(
n
1−e−0.1
)⌉
. In this case, we have from (32),
(
m
i− t+ 1
)t
·
(
t
`
)t
≤

(
100 log
(
n
1−e−0.1
)
+ 1
)
e−100
1000 log(n/(1− e−0.1))
t
≤ e−100 · 2−t−1
≤ e−100
(
1− e−0.1
n
)100
· 1
2
≤ e−(1− e−0.1)2e−100 · p
2
,
where the final inequality follows since p ≥ 100 e100n(1−e−0.1) .
Combining the above inequality with (30), (29), we have that for all 0 ≤ m ≤ n− 1,∑
a∈Szero≥im,k
ν(a) ≤ (1− e−0.1) · e−p · Pm+1,k+( d−12 ).
Case 2: t 6=
⌈
100 log
(
n
1−e−0.1
)⌉
. From our choice of t, we must have t = di/2e and t ≤
⌈
100 log
(
n
1−e−0.1
)⌉
.
From our assumption on m, it follows that
t ≥ i/2 ≥ m(1− e
−0.1)
2
≥ 5 log
(
1
1− e−0.1
)
.
Then by (32) (
m
i− t+ 1
)t
·
(
t
`
)t
≤
(
te−100
1000 log(n/(1− e−0.1))
)t
≤ e−100 · 4−t−1
≤ (1− e−0.1)5e−100/(4t)
≤ (1− e−0.1)2e−100/(4t). (33)
As t = di/2e, we have that i ≤ 2t and so m ≤ i1−e−0.1 ≤ 2t1−e−0.1 . Now, recall our assumption that  > 1n2/3
(which holds for all 0 ≤ m ≤ n − 1). This means that m ≤ O(tn2/3) ≤ O(n2/3 log n). Hence, for any
sufficiently large n, we must have m ≤ n/2− 1. Thus, we have
p(n− 1−m)
m+ 1
≥ pn
4m
≥ 10
(1− e−0.1)m ≥
1
t
, (34)
where the second-to-last inequality comes from p ≥ 100 e100n(1−e−0.1) and the last inequality comes from m ≤
2t
1−e−0.1 . As a result, by combining (33) and (34), we obtain(
m
i− t+ 1
)t
·
(
t
`
)t
≤ (1− e−0.1)2e−100 · p(n− 1−m)
m+ 1
. (35)
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By (35), together with (30) and (29), we have that for ` ∈ {d−12 , d−32 },∑
a∈Szero≥im,k
ν(a) ≤ e−(1− e−0.1) · p(n− 1−m)
m+ 1
· Pm+1,k+`.
Thus, in both cases 1 and 2 we consider, we have, for `1, `2 ∈
{
d−1
2 ,
d−3
2
}
, and the claimed values of m, p,
∑
a∈Szero≥im,k
ν(a) ≤ e−p(1− e−0.1) ·
(
Pm+1,k+`1 +
p(n−m+ 1)
m+ 1
· Pm+1,k+`2
)
≤ e−p(1− e−0.5) ·
(
Pm+1,k+`1 +
p(n−m+ 1)
m+ 1
· Pm+1,k+`2
)
.
Combining this with (26) and (28) yields the claimed bound.
4 Lower Bound for Binary Summation
In this section we prove our lower bound on the communication complexity of any non-interactive pure-
DPshuffled protocol that can perform bit addition with small error. Specifically, we show that any O(1)-
DPshuffled protocol must have communication complexity at least Ω(
√
log n). In fact, as formalized below,
our lower bound holds even against any protocol that has an expected error of O(n0.5−Ω(1)). Recall that
the standard randomized response, which is an e-DPlocal protocol, incurs an error of O(n
0.5) and has
communication complexity of only one bit. Thus, our lower bound states that, even to slightly improve upon
this simple pure-DP protocol in terms of error, the communication complexity must blow up to Ω(
√
log n).
Theorem 17. For any constants  > 0 and χ > 0, there is no -DPshuffled non-interactive protocol with
communication complexity o(
√
log n) that incurs O
(
n0.5−χ
)
error.
We remark that Cheu et al. [CSU+19] proved that, with appropriate setting of parameters, the simple
randomized response is an (, δ)-DPshuffled protocol and incurs an expected error of at most O
(
2
log(1/δ)
)
.
Since the user’s communication in their protocol is just a bit, our result also gives a communication complexity
separation between pure-DPshuffled and approximate-DPshuffled.
Another remark here is that our lower bound in Theorem 17 is roughly a square of the upper bound
O(log n) obtained in our protocol for the previous section (for constant values of ). It remains an interesting
open question to close this O(
√
log n) gap. On this front, we will show in Section 4.3 that, for our specific
approach, O(
√
log n) lower bound is the best one could hope for, which means that our lower bound in
Theorem 17 is tight for the current approach.
We first recall the following standard notion from probability theory.
Definition 18 (Moment Generating Function). Let Y be a random variable supported on (a subset of) Rk
for some k ∈ N. Its moment generating function (MGF) is defined as MY(t) = E[e〈t,Y〉].
Throughout this section, we will be dealing with pairs of random variables whose MGFs are within a
certain factor of each other. The following definition will be particularly handy.
Definition 19 (Bounded MGF ratio). We say that two random variables Y,Y′ supported on (a subset of)
Rk have e-bounded MGF ratio if and only if, for all t ∈ Rk we have that MY(t)MY′ (t) ∈ [e
−, e].
For two random variables Y,Y′, let SD(Y,Y′) denote the total variation distance between them.
Our proofs follow exactly the same outline as in Section 1.3. Specifically, the remainder of this section
is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, we prove that a pure-DPshuffled protocol implies bounded MGF ratio
condition. Then, in Section 4.2, we give a lower bound on C,γ from Definition 5 and use it to prove our
main theorem of this section (Theorem 17). Finally, in Section 4.3, we provide an example which shows that
our lower bound for the question is tight.
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Remark 20. The lower bound of Theorem 17 has been stated for non-interactive protocols in the shuffled
model that are symmetric, i.e., protocols for which the local randomizer (given by X0 and X1 from Defini-
tion 7) is identical for each user. However, the lower bound actually generalizes to protocols that are not
necessarily symmetric (and in which the number of messages can vary from user to user). Indeed, one can
show that it is not possible to obtain error O(n0.5−χ) unless, for at least 1 − o(1) fraction of the users, the
communication complexity is Ω(
√
log n). We have omitted the formal statement for the sake of clarity of
exposition, but the proof is almost identical, as the e-bounded MGF property (given by Lemma 22) holds for
any user’s X0, X1 (this can be seen by comparing two sequences that differ in the given user’s input), and
Theorem 23 also applies to the asymmetric case (with the guarantee that 1− o(1) fraction of the users must
have SD(X0,X1) ≥ 1− n−Ω(1)).
4.1 Pure-DP Implies MGF Bounded Ratio
In this subsection, we will prove a general necessary (but not sufficient) condition on -DP protocols in terms
of the MGFs of X0,X1. A straightforward observation we will use is the following:
Observation 21. Let Y,Y′ be two random variables with the same support supp(Y) = supp(Y′) ⊆ Rk
such that Pr[Y=v]Pr[Y′=v] ∈ [e−, e]. Then, Y,Y′ satisfies e-bounded MGF ratio.
Proof. Consider any t ∈ Rk. We have
MY1(t)
MY2(t)
=
∑
y∈Rm Pr[Y1 = y] · e〈t,y〉∑
y∈Rm Pr[Y2 = y] · e〈t,y〉
.
From our assumption, each ratio of the corresponding terms on the RHS lies in [e−, e]. Hence, we can
conclude that MY1(t)/MY2(t) ∈ [e−, e] as desired.
In general, the converse of the above is not true, i.e., there are pairs of distributions whose probability
ratios are not within the desired range but the MGF ratios are within the range (e.g., the distributions from
our randomizer in the previous section). Nonetheless, we can show that, for any -DP protocol, X0,X1 must
satisfy the weaker condition of e-bounded MGF ratio, as stated below. This is our main observation.
Lemma 22. For any -DP protocol, X0,X1 must satisfy e-bounded MGF ratio.
To prove Lemma 22, a key (well-known) multiplicative property of MGF that we need is that, if Y,Y′ ∈
Rk are two independent random variables, then MY+Y′(t) = MY(t) ·MY′(t) for all t ∈ Rk. We this in
mind, we can prove Lemma 22 as follows.
Proof of Lemma 22. Consider two sequences 0 . . . 00 and 0 . . . 01, each of length n. Let Y0,Y1 ∈ Rk denote
the views of the shuffled output on the corresponding input vectors, where Y0j denote the number of j’s
received by the analyzer for the input vector 0 . . . 00 and Y1j denote the number of j’s received by the
analyzer for the input vector 0 . . . 01. Notice that Y0 is simply a sum of n i.i.d. copies of X0 and Y1 is a
sum of (n− 1) i.i.d. copies of X0 and a copy of X1. Observe also that -DP implies that Y0,Y1 satisfy the
condition in Observation 21. From this, we have
[e−, e] 3 MY0(t)
MY1(t)
=
(MX0(t))
n
(MX0(t))n−1 ·MX1(t) =
MX0(t)
MX1(t)
, (36)
for all t ∈ Rk. This completes our proof.
4.2 From MGF Bounded Ratio to Communication Lower Bound
We will now use the MGF bounded ratio property from Lemma 22 to show the communication complexity
of any non-interactive protocol for summation that incurs small error. To do so, let us recall below a known
result that any protocol that can perform binary summation to within a small error must have large statistical
distance between X0 and X1. (In fact, the bound below holds even for DPlocal protocols.)
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Theorem 23 ([CSS12]). Any non-interactive protocol that can perform binary summation to within an
expected absolute error of α (even in the local model) must satisfy SD(X0,X1) ≥ 1−O
(
α√
n
)
.
Note that Theorem 23 is not inherently about privacy, but rather about the utility and the output
distributions. We remark that the above fact was implicitly first shown in [CSS12] under a slightly different
terminology. For completeness, we provide a full proof of Theorem 23 in Appendix C
Thanks to Lemma 22 and Theorem 23, to prove our lower bound (Theorem 17), it now suffices to show
that, for any pair of random variables Y,Y′ whose supports lie in ∆k,m that satisfies both e-bounded MGF
ratio and if SD(Y,Y′) is large, then m log k must be large. The main lemma of this subsection, which
encapsulates a quantitative version of the aforementioned statement, is stated formally below.
Lemma 24. Let Y,Y′ be two random variables supported on ∆k,m with e-bounded MGF ratio. Then,
SD(Y,Y′) ≤ 1− 2−O(m2 log k).
Before we prove Lemma 24, we note that plugging together Lemma 24, Lemma 22, and Theorem 23
immediately gives Theorem 17, as follows.
Proof of Theorem 17. Consider any -DP1shuffled protocol that performs binary summation to within an ex-
pected absolute error of α := O(n0.5−γ). From Observation 21, X0,X1 must satisfy e-MGF bounded ratio.
Applying Lemma 24 implies that
SD(X0,X1) ≤ 1− 2−O(m2 log k).
Furthermore, since the expected error of the protocol is at most α = O(n0.5−χ), Theorem 23 implies that
SD(X0,X1) ≥ 1−O
(
α√
n
)
= 1−O
(
1
nχ
)
.
Combining the above two inequalities, we must have m2 log k ≥ Ω,χ(log n), which implies that the commu-
nication complexity m log k must be at least Ω,χ(
√
log n) as desired.
Dual Approach and Proof of Lemma 24. We devote the rest of this subsection to the proof of
Lemma 24. For notational convenience, we use py and p
′
y to denote Pr[Y = y] and Pr[Y
′ = y] respectively.
Before we formalize the proof below, let us first present an informal overview of the proof. Recall that
1−SD(Y,Y′) is equal to∑y∈∆k,m min{py, p′y} = minS⊆∆k,m {∑y∈S py +∑y∈∆k,m\S p′y}. Hence, it suffices
for us to show that, for every S ⊆ ∆k,m, we have∑
y∈S
py +
∑
y∈∆k,m\S
p′y ≥ 2−O(m
2 log k). (37)
We will give a “dual certificate” for this statement. Notice that since the total probability of each of Y,Y′
must be one, we have
∑
y∈∆k,m py = 1 and
∑
y∈∆k,m p
′
y = 1. Of course, we also have the non-negativity
constraints that py, p
′
y ≥ 0 for all y ∈ ∆k,m.
Furthermore, the e-bounded MGF ratio property between Y and Y′ simply translates to the following
linear inequalities for all t ∈ Rk: ∑
y∈∆k,m
e〈t,y〉 · p′y −
∑
y∈∆k,m
e〈t,y〉− · py ≥ 0, (38)
and ∑
y∈∆k,m
e〈t,y〉 · py −
∑
y∈∆k,m
e〈t,y〉− · p′y ≥ 0. (39)
Hence, we simply have a system of infinite) linear inequalities and we would like to certify a particular
linear inequality (37). We may do this by writing (37) as a linear combination of the constraints.
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As a wishful thinking, if we could somehow “extract” only the py and p
′
y terms from (38) and (39), then
we would be done because we would simply have e · py ≥ p′y ≥ e− · py which can easily be combined
with the total probability and non-negativity constraints to get a good bound on
∑
y∈S py +
∑
y∈∆k,m\S p
′
y.
Of course, such extraction is not possible since, for any value t we plug into (38) and (39), we always get
non-zero coefficients for all vectors in ∆k,m, not just y.
With the above in mind, our goal is now to select one t = τ(y) for each y in such a way that the coefficient
of y from its own inequality (i.e., t = τ(y)) “dominates” the coefficients of y from other inequalities (i.e.,
t = τ(y′) for any y′ 6= y). A more precise version of the statement is proved below. Note here that eβ(y)
here should be thought of as the “scaling factor” for the inequality for y.
Lemma 25. For any  > 0, there exists a mapping τ : ∆k,m → Rk and β : ∆k,m → R such that the following
hold for all y ∈ ∆k,m:
0 ≥ 〈τ(y),y〉+ β(y) ≥ ζ := −O(m2 log k), (40)
and
e〈τ(y),y〉+β(y) ≥ 2e ·
∑
y′∈∆k,m\{y}
e〈τ(y′),y〉+β(y′). (41)
Proof. Let ρ =  + 10 ln(k + 1) + 10. We pick τ(y) = ρ · 2y and β(y) = ρ · (−‖y‖22 −m2). It is obvious to
see that (40) holds. Next, to prove (41), let us first observe the following identity:
〈τ(y′),y〉+ β(y′) = ρ (2 〈y′,y〉 − ‖y′‖2 −m2)
= ρ
(‖y‖22 − ‖y − y′‖22 −m2)
= 〈τ(y),y〉+ β(y)− ρ · ‖y − y′‖22. (42)
We may bound the right hand side of (41) as∑
y′∈∆k,m\{y}
e〈τ(y′),y〉+β(y′) (42)= e〈τ(y),y〉+β(y) ·
∑
y′∈∆k,m\{y}
e−ρ‖y−y
′‖22
= e〈τ(y),y〉+β(y) ·
2m2∑
i=1
e−ρi · |{y′ ∈ ∆k,m | ‖y − y′‖22 = i}|
 . (43)
We can bound |{y′ ∈ ∆k,m | ‖y − y′‖22 = i}| as follows.
|{y′ ∈ ∆k,m | ‖y − y′‖22 = i}| ≤ |{z ∈ Zk | ‖z‖22 = i}|
≤ 2i · |{z ∈ Zk | ‖z‖22 = i, z1, . . . , zk ≥ 0}|
≤ 2i · |{(x1, . . . , xk) ∈ Zk≥0 | x1 + · · ·+ xk = i}|
= 2i ·
(
k + i− 1
i
)
≤ 2i
(
e(k + i− 1)
i
)i
≤ (2e(k + 1))i, (44)
where the second inequality comes from the fact that there are at most i non-zero coordinates of z and there
are two choices of sign for those coordinates.
Plugging (44) into (43), we have
∑
y′∈∆k,m\{y}
e〈τ(y′),y〉+β(y′) ≤ e〈τ(y),y〉+β(y) ·
2m2∑
i=1
(
e−ρ · 2e(k + 1))i

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(From our choice of ρ) ≤ e〈τ(y),y〉+β(y) ·
2m2∑
i=1
(
1
10e
)i
≤ e〈τ(y),y〉+β(y) · 1
2e
,
as desired.
With Lemma 25 ready, we can now prove Lemma 24.
Proof of Lemma 24. Let Y,Y′ be two random variables supported on (subsets of ) ∆k,m. Suppose that
Y,Y′ satisfy e-bounded MGF ratio. Let τ, β be as in Lemma 25.
Consider any set S ⊆ ∆k,m. For every y′ ∈ S, MY(τ(y′)) ≥ e− ·MY′(τ(y′)) is equivalent to∑
y∈∆k,m
e〈τ(y′),y〉−β(y′) · py −
∑
y∈∆k,m
e〈τ(y′),y〉−β(y′)− · p′y ≥ 0. (45)
Similarly, for every y′ ∈ ∆k,m \ S, MY′(τ(y′)) ≥ e− ·MY(τ(y′)) can be rearranged as∑
y∈∆k,m
e〈τ(y′),y〉−β(y′) · p′y −
∑
y∈∆k,m
e〈τ(y′),y〉−β(y′)− · py ≥ 0. (46)
By adding (45) for all y′ ∈ S with (46) for all y′ ∈ ∆k,m \ S, we have
∑
y∈∆k,m
∑
y′∈S
e〈τ(y′),y〉−β(y′) −
∑
y′∈∆k,m\S
e〈τ(y′),y〉−β(y′)−
 py
+
∑
y∈∆k,m
 ∑
y′∈∆k,m\S
e〈τ(y′),y〉−β(y′) −
∑
y′∈S
e〈τ(y′),y〉−β(y′)−
 p′y ≥ 0. (47)
Now, for all y ∈ S, we can upper bound the coefficient of p′y in (47) by∑
y′∈∆k,m\S
e〈τ(y′),y〉−β(y′) −
∑
y′∈S
e〈τ(y′),y〉−β(y′)−
≤
∑
y′∈∆k,m\{y}
e〈τ(y′),y〉−β(y′) − e〈τ(y),y〉−β(y)−
(41)
≤ −0.5e〈τ(y),y〉−β(y)−
(40)
≤ −eζ−1−.
Similarly, for all y ∈ ∆k,m \ S, the coefficient of py in (47) is at most −eζ−1−.
Moreover, for all y ∈ S, we can upper bound the coefficient in (47) of py by∑
y′∈S
e〈τ(y′),y〉−β(y′) −
∑
y′∈∆k,m\S
e〈τ(y′),y〉−β(y′)− ≤
∑
y′∈∆k,m
e〈τ(y′),y〉−β(y′)
(41)
≤
(
1 +
1
2e
)
e〈τ(y),y〉−β(y)
(40)
≤ 2.
Similarly, for all y ∈ S, the coefficient of p′y in (47) is at most 2.
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Plugging these back into (47), we have
0 ≤ 2
∑
y∈S
py +
∑
y∈∆k,m\S
p′y
− eζ−1−
∑
y∈S
p′y +
∑
y∈∆k,m\S
py
 .
Now, using the fact that
∑
y∈∆k,m py =
∑
y∈∆k,m p
′
y = 1, we can further simplify the above to
2eζ−1− ≤ (2 + eζ−1−)
∑
y∈S
py +
∑
y∈∆k,m\S
p′y
 .
This means that ∑
y∈S
py +
∑
y∈∆k,m\S
p′y
 ≥ 2eζ−1−
2 + eζ−1−
≥ 2−O(m2 log k),
where the second inequality follows from (40). This establishes (37) and hence we have SD(Y,Y′) ≤
1− 2−O(m2 log k) as desired.
4.3 Limitations of the Lower Bound Approach
In this subsection, we argue that the bound we achieve in Lemma 24 is essentially tight, even for k = 2.
In other words, our approach of using only bounded MGF ratio property and the total variation distance
bound from Theorem 23 cannot give any lower bound better than O(
√
log n). Specifically, the main lemma
of this section is stated below.
Lemma 26. For every  > 0 and γ ∈ (0, 0.5), there exist two random variables Y,Y′ supported on (subsets
of) ∆2,m for some m = O(
√
log(1/γ)) such that SD(Y,Y′) ≥ 1− γ and that Y,Y′ satisfy the e-bounded
MGF ratio property.
Similar to when we analyze our binary summation protocol in Section 3, it will be more convenient to
consider the one-dimensional case, where the two random variables are from {0, 1, . . . ,m} rather than ∆2,m.
In other words, it is more convenient to state our result in this section as follows:
Lemma 27. For every  > 0 and γ ∈ (0, 0.5), there exist two random variables Y 0 and Y 1 supported on
{0, . . . ,m} for some m = O(
√
log(1/γ)) such that SD(Y 0, Y 1) ≥ 1 − γ and that Y 0, Y 1 satisfy e-bounded
MGF ratio property.
Similar to the analogous statement in Section 3, it is easy to see that Lemma 27 implies Lemma 26.
Proof of Lemma 26 from Lemma 27. For any  > 0 and γ ∈ (0, 0.5), let Y 0, Y 1 be the random variables
from Lemma 27 whose values are from {0, 1, . . . ,m} where m = O(
√
log(1/γ)). We define the random
variable Y,Y′ by Y = (Y 0,m − Y 0) and Y′ = (Y 1,m − Y 1). Clearly, SD(Y,Y′) = SD(Y 0, Y 1) ≥ 1 − γ.
Finally, for any t = (t1, t2) ∈ R2 we have
MY(t)
MY′(t)
=
MY 0(t1 − t2)
MY 1(t1 − t2) ,
which lies in [e−, e] due to the e-bounded MGF ratio property of Y 0, Y 1.
4.3.1 Discrete Gaussian Distributions
Our construction for Lemma 27 will be based on the discrete Gaussian distribution, which we define below.
To do so, we start by defining the (one-dimensional) Gaussian function centered at c with parameter s as
ρs,c(x) = exp
(
−pi(x− c)
2
s2
)
,
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for all x ∈ R. For any countable set A ⊆ R, we define ρs,c(A) as
∑
x∈A ρs,c(x). For any countable set A ⊆ R
such that
∑
x∈A ρs,c(x) is finite, we may define the discrete Gaussian distribution over A centered at c with
parameter s denoted by DA,s,c by
DA,s,c(x) = ρs,c(x)
ρs,c(A)
,
for all x ∈ A. Throughout this work, we only use A that is either finite or an additive subgroup of Z; for
both cases, it is not hard to see that ρs,c(A) is finite and hence we will not state this condition again. For
brevity, we sometimes drop the subscript c when c = 0.
We will use a well-known property of lattices (cf. [MR07, GPV08, AGHS13]). Since we will be using
this property only in one dimension, we shall not fully define the notion of lattices for higher dimensions.
Recall that a one-dimensional lattice is an additive subgroup aZ := {at | t ∈ Z} for some a ∈ R+. Informally
speaking, the property we use is that, if we choose s to be sufficiently large, “shifting” the discrete Gaussian
distribution by c does not change its normalization factor too much. This is stated more formally below.
(For reference, please refer to [GPV08, Lemma 2.6] which states a more general version of the statement
that also works for higher-dimensional lattices.)
Lemma 28. For any constants a, δ ∈ R+, there exists a sufficiently large constant s∗ = s∗(a, δ) such that,
for any c ∈ R, the following holds:
ρs∗,c(aZ)
ρs∗(aZ)
∈ [e−δ, 1]. (48)
We will also use the following observation that, similar to the (continuous) Gaussian distribution, we may
choose a sufficiently large truncation point `∗a for which the total mass of all points x with |X − c| > `∗a is
arbitrarily small. Note that the only reason the observation is not completely trivial is that the truncation
point should work for all centers c. Nonetheless, the proof of the observation is still rather straightforward,
and we defer it to Appendix D.
Observation 29. For any constants a, δ ∈ R+, let s∗ = s∗(a, δ) be as in Lemma 28. Then, for any λ > 0,
there exists a sufficiently large positive integer `∗ = `∗(a, δ, λ) such that, for any c ∈ R, we have
Pr
X∼DaZ,s∗,c
[|X − c| > `∗a] ≤ λ.
4.3.2 Proof of Lemma 27
Having stated the necessary background, we now describe our construction, starting with an informal intu-
ition; all arguments will be subsequently formalized. Distributions of both Y 0, Y 1 will place γ2 probability
masses at each of 0 and m, and these two points shared by the supports of Y 0 and Y 1. (This ensures that
the total variation distance of Y 0 and Y 1 are at least 1− γ.) In the middle, we then place discrete Gaussian
distributions centered at c = m/2 for Y 0 and Y 1, with that of Y 0 only supported on even numbers whereas
that of Y 1 supported on odd numbers. These discrete Gaussian distributions are truncated so that the
supports are within the range of [c− w, c+ w] for some parameter w.
The reason behind the construction is as follows. First, when |t| ≥ O(
√
log(1/γ)), it is not hard to see
that the MGFs at t are dominated by the terms corresponding to the points 0 or m. Our parameters are
selected in such a way that, when this is not the case, it must be that |t|  w. In this case, we observe that
the MGFs of discrete Guassian distributions are simply proportional to normalization terms of other discrete
Gaussian distributions, shifted by O(t) (and truncated appropriately). (See (50) below.) Since |t|  w, we
can then apply Lemma 28 and Observation 29 to get a good bound on these terms. This concludes the main
ideas in the proof, which is presented more formally below.
Proof of Lemma 27. We will assume w.l.o.g. that  ≤ 0.1, as otherwise we may consider the case  = 0.1
instead. Before we can describe and analyze the distributions, we have to specify certain parameters:
• Let s = s∗(2, /4) from Lemma 28 (i.e., for 2Z lattice and δ = /4).
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Figure 3: The probability mass functions of γ · µ + (1 − γ) · DS0,s,c and γ · µ + (1 − γ) · DS1,s,c for parameters
γ = 0.02, c = 50,m = 2c = 100, w = 20, s = 30. The x-axis corresponds to the value of the random variable and the
y-axis corresponds to the probability mass at that value. The red points and the blue points correspond respectively
to γ · µ+ (1− γ) · DS0,s,c and γ · µ+ (1− γ) · DS1,s,c.
• Let ` = `∗(2, /4, 1− e−/4) from Observation 29 (i.e., for 2Z lattice, δ = /4 and λ = 1− e−/4).
• Let w = s
2
√
log(1/γ)
pi + 2`
∗, c =
⌈
w + log
(
2
(e−1)
)
+
√
log(1/γ)
⌉
and m = 2c.
Let S0 denote the set 2Z∩ [c−w, c+w] and S1 denote (2Z+ 1)∩ [c−w, c+w]. Let µ be the distribution
that has probability mass 0.5 at 0 and 0.5 at m. We let Y 0 be sampled from the mixture distribution
γ · µ + (1 − γ) · DS0,s,c and Y 1 be sampled from the mixture distribution γ · µ + (1 − γ) · DS1,s,c. Figure 3
illustrates an example of the two distributions.
Observe that supp(Y 0) ∩ supp(Y 1) = {0,m}, and each of the two points has mass γ/2. Hence, we have
SD(Y 0, Y 1) = 1− γ as desired.
We will next verify that Y 0, Y 1 satisfies e-bounded MGF ratio. To do this, observe that for i ∈ {0, 1},
MY i(t) = γ ·Mµ(t) + (1− γ) ·MDSi,s,c(t). (49)
We now consider two cases, based on whether |t| >√log(1/γ).
1. |t| >√log(1/γ). There are two subcases here: t >√log(1/γ) or t < −√log(1/γ). Let us first assume
that t >
√
log(1/γ). In this case, since the maximum number in supp(DSi,s,c) is at most c + w, we
have MDSi,s,c(t) ≤ et(c+w). On the other hand, we have Mµ(t) ≥ e
tm
2 =
e2tc
2 . Hence, we have
MDSi,s,c(t)
Mµ(t)
≤ 2et(−c+w) ≤ (e − 1)γ,
where the inequality comes from our choice of c.
As a result, from (49), we have
γ ·Mµ(t) ≤MY i(t) = γ ·Mµ(t) + (1− γ) ·MDSi,s,c(t) ≤ eγ ·Mµ(t).
Thus,
MY 1 (t)
MY 2 (t)
∈ [e−, e] as desired. The subcase t < −√log(1/γ) is similar; in particular, we also have
MDSi,s,c (t)
Mµ(t)
≤ et(c−w)0.5 = 2et(c−w) ≤ (e − 1)γ, which results in the same conclusion.
2. |t| ≤√log(1/γ). In this case, we further rearrange MDSi,s,c(t) as
MDSi,s,c(t) =
∑
y∈Si
DSi,s,c(y) · ety
=
∑
y∈Si
ρs,c(y)
ρs,c(Si)
· ety
=
1
ρs,c(Si)
∑
y∈Si
e−
pi(y−c)2
s2
+ty
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=
1
ρs,c(Si)
∑
y∈Si
e−
pi(y−c−0.5s2t/pi)2
s2
+
pi((c+0.5s2t/pi)2−c2)
s2
=
1
ρs,c(Si)
∑
y∈Si
e−
pi(y−c−0.5s2t/pi)2
s2
+0.5t(2c+0.5s2t/pi)
=
e0.5t(2c+0.5s
2t/pi)
ρs,c(Si)
∑
y∈Si
e−
pi(y−c−0.5s2t/pi)2
s2
= e0.5t(2c+0.5s
2t/pi) · ρs,c+0.5s2t/pi(Si)
ρs,c(Si)
. (50)
Now, observe that
ρs,c(2Z+ i) ≥ ρs,c(Si)
= ρs,c(2Z+ i) ·
(
1− Pr
X∼D2Z+i,s,c
[X /∈ Si]
)
≥ ρs,c(2Z+ i) ·
(
1− Pr
X∼D2Z+i,s,c
[|X − c| ≥ w]
)
(from our choice of w) ≥ ρs,c(2Z+ i) ·
(
1− Pr
X∼D2Z+i,s,c
[|X − c| ≥ 2`∗]
)
= ρs,c(2Z+ i) ·
(
1− Pr
X∼D2Z,s,c−i
[|X − c− i| ≥ 2`∗]
)
≥ e−/8 · ρs,c(2Z+ i),
where the last inequality comes from our choice of `∗.
Similarly, observe that
ρs,c+0.5s2t/pi(2Z+ i) ≥ ρs,c+0.5s2t/pi(Si)
= ρs,c+0.5s2t/pi(2Z+ i) ·
(
1− Pr
X∼D2Z+i,s,c+0.5s2t/pi
[X /∈ Si]
)
≥ ρs,c+0.5s2t/pi(2Z+ i) ·
(
1− Pr
X∼D2Z+i,s,c+0.5s2t/pi
[|X − c| ≥ w − |0.5s2t/pi|]
)
(from our choice of w) ≥ ρs,c+0.5s2t/pi(2Z+ i) ·
(
1− Pr
X∼D2Z+i,s,c+0.5s2t/pi
[|X − c| ≥ 2`∗]
)
= ρs,c+0.5s2t/pi(2Z+ i) ·
(
1− Pr
X∼D2Z,s,c+0.5s2t/pi−i
[|X − c− i| ≥ 2`∗]
)
≥ e−/8 · ρs,c+0.5s2t/pi(2Z+ i).
Plugging the above two inequalities back into (50), we have
MDSi,c,s(t) ∈
[
e−/8, e/8
]
· e0.5t(2c+0.5s2t/pi) · ρs,c+0.5s2t/pi(2Z+ i)
ρs,c(2Z+ i)
=
[
e−/8, e/8
]
· e0.5t(2c+0.5s2t/pi) · ρs,c+0.5s2t/pi−i(2Z)
ρs,c−i(2Z)
. (51)
Finally, from our choice of s, we have that
ρs,c−i(2Z)
ρs(2Z) ,
ρs,c+0.5s2t/pi−i(2Z)
ρs(2Z) ∈ [e−/4, 1]. Combining these
with (51), we have
MDSi,c,s(t) ∈
[
e−/2, e/2
]
· e0.5t(2c+0.5s2t/pi).
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As a result, we must have
MDS1,c,s (t)
MDS2,c,s (t)
∈ [e−, e]. From this and from (49), we have MY 1 (t)MY 2 (t) ∈ [e
−, e]
as desired.
5 From Binary Summation to Real Summation
In this section use our pure-DPshuffled protocol for binary summation in Section 3 to obtain a pure-DPshuffled
protocol for summation of real numbers in the interval [0, 1]. More precisely we show the following, which is
a more quantitative version of Theorem 3.
Theorem 30. For every sufficiently large n and  ∈ (0, 1) there is an -DPshuffled protocol for summation
for inputs x1, . . . , xn ∈ [0, 1], where each user sends O
(
log3 n

)
messages each of length O(log log n) bits to
the analyzer, and has expected error at most O
(√
log(1/)
3/2
)
.
The randomizer and analyzer of the protocol are shown as Algorithms 3 and 4 respectively3 (the sequence
(j)j∈N will be specified below.). The idea is to round each input to 2 log n bits of precision (resulting in a
negligible rounding error) and then run an independent binary summation protocol for each bit position. By
“attaching” j to each message from the binary summation protocol for bit position j, we can run all protocols
as a single shuffle, using composition to bound the total privacy loss. (We observe that composition of t
independent shuffled model protocols into a single protocol is possible in general, at the expense of increasing
the number of bits in each message by log t.) By allocating a large share of the privacy budget to the most
significant bits, the error can be kept within a constant factor of the error for binary summation. The
communication complexity is somewhat larger than that of the binary summation protocol: the number of
messages per user is increased by roughly a factor of O(log2 n) and each message is about log log n bits (since
we need 2 log n different symbols).
Proof of Theorem 30. For each j = 1, . . . , d2 log ne, we let j = max{ 0.9j20 , 4 logn}. The multiset of all
messages output by RealRandomizer(j)j∈N,n(xi), for i = 1, . . . , n is in one-to-one correspondence with the
sequence of multisets output by BinaryRandomizerj ,n(xi[j])), for j = 1, . . . , 2 log n. Thus, we can use
composition (see, e.g., [DR14, Theorem 3.15]) to bound the privacy parameter of the combined protocol by
the sum of privacy parameters j :
2 logn∑
j=1
j ≤
2 logn∑
j=1
(
0.9j
20
+

4 log n
)
≤  .
Hence, the protocol is -DP. Next, we consider the expected error of the analyzer. Let x¯i =
∑2 logn
j=1 xi[j]
be the rounded version of xi. Since |
∑n
i=1 x¯i −
∑n
i=1 xi| ≤
∑n
i=1 |x¯i − xi| < 1/n, it suffices to argue
that the protocol outputs a good approximation of
∑n
i=1 x¯i. To do so, let j
∗ be the smallest integer for
which j∗ =

4 logn . Recall from Theorem 8 that the expected error from the jth bit analyzer is at most
O
(√
log(1/)
3/2
)
. Since the real summation analyzer outputs a weighted sum of contributions for each bit
position obtained from the binary sum analyzers, the total error in the weighted sum returned by the
analyzer is bounded by
O
2 logn∑
j=1
1
2j
·
√
log(1/j)

3/2
j
 = O
j∗−1∑
j=1
1
2j
·
√
log(1/) + j
(0.81)1.5j · 3/2 +
2 logn∑
j=j∗
1
2j
·
√
log n ·√log(1/) + log log n
3/2

≤ O
(√
log(1/)
3/2
)
+O
(√
log(1/)
3/2
· (log n)
3/2 · √log log n
2j∗
)
3Note that xi[j] denote the jth bit in a binary representation of x ∈ [0, 1], such that xi =
∑∞
j=1 x[j]/2
j (e.g., the represen-
tation of x = 1 has x[j] = 1 for j = 1, 2, . . . ).
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≤ O
(√
log(1/)
3/2
)
,
where the last inequality follows from our choice of j∗, which by definition of j implies that 0.9j
∗ ≤ 5logn .
Finally, we consider the number of messages
∑2 logn
j=1 dj sent by each randomizer. From Theorem 8, we
have dj = O
(
logn
j
)
. Hence, the total number of messages sent per user is
2 logn∑
j=1
dj = O
logn∑
j=1
log n
j
 ≤ O
logn∑
j=1
log n
/(4 log n)
 = O( log3 n

)
,
which completes our proof.
6 Conclusion and Open Questions
In this work, we gave the first pure-DPshuffled protocols for binary and real summation with constant error.
We further prove a communication lower bound for any non-interactive protocols for binary summation.
While these have advanced our understanding of pure-DPshuffled protocols, there are still many questions left
open after this work. Specifically, the immediate open questions are:
• Can we improve the error guarantee in the (binary and real) summation protocols to achieve the
asymptotically optimal guarantee of 1/, which can be achieved by DPcentral protocols [DMNS06]?
• What is the optimal per user communication complexity of non-interactive DPshuffled protocols for
binary and real summation? As we have shown, the communication complexity for binary summation
lies between O(log n) and Ω(
√
log n). On the other hand, for real summation, the only lower bound
is the trivial Ω(log n) bound (which holds even without privacy concerns) whereas our upper bound
is O(log
3 n). We remark here that, our approach for real summation (of running the pure-DP binary
summation protocol independently for each coordinate in the base-2 representation) cannot achieve
better than O(log
3/2 n) communication complexity, because we have to consider Ω(log n) coordinates
and, from our lower bound, each coordinate requires at least Ω(
√
log n) bits of communication.
• In Appendix A, we show that our binary summation protocol also yields a pure-DP protocol for
histograms (aka frequency estimator) with error O(logB log n) but with linear per user communication
complexity. The latter is in contrast to the approximate-DP multi-message protocol of [GGK+19],
which has a per user communication complexity of only O(poly(log n, logB)) and incurs a similar
error of O(poly(log n, logB)) bits. It is hence a very interesting open question to come up with (or
rule out) a pure-DP protocol with a smaller communication complexity.
• Can we exploit interactivity to break our Ω(
√
log n) communication lower bound? Alternately, can
we prove any non-trivial lower bound that holds also with interaction?
On a high-level, it would also be interesting to develop tools to help prove guarantees for pure-DPshuffled
protocols. In the case of approximate-DP, there are amplification theorems [EFM+19, BBGN19c] that can
yield an approximate-DPshuffled protocol from a DPlocal protocol. Although this may not be optimal in some
cases (as shown by the multi-message protocols in [GGK+19, BBGN19b, GMPV19]), such theorems can
be conveniently applied to a large class of protocols and yield good approximate-DP guarantees. On the
other hand, our proofs in this work are specific to our carefully designed protocols. It would be much more
convenient if one can give a unifying theorem that proves pure privacy guarantees for any protocol with
easily verifiable conditions.
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A Pure Protocol for Histograms
A well-studied generalization of binary summation is the problem of computing histograms (aka point func-
tions or frequency estimation), where each of n users is given an element in the set {1, . . . , B} and the goal
is to estimate the number of users holding any element j ∈ {1, . . . , B}, and with the smallest possible `∞
error (across the B coordinates). For B = 2, this reduces to binary summation.
The smallest possible error for computing histograms is Θ(min(logB, log(1/δ))/) [DMNS06, BNS16,
BS15, HT10] in the central model and Θ(
√
n logB/) [BS15] in the local model. Recent work of [GGK+19]
gave an approximate-DP protocol with errorO
(
logB +
√
logB log(1/(δ))

)
where each user sendsO
(
log(1/(δ))
2
)
messages (each consisting of O(logB log n)) bits), and the subsequent work of [BC19] gave an approximate-
DP protocol in the multi-message shuffled model with an (incomparable) error of O(log(1/δ)/2) but with
each user communicating a very large number O(B) of messages.
Our pure binary summation protocol (Theorem 2) implies as a black-box the first pure-DP protocol with
polylogarithmic error for computing histograms, albeit with very large communication.
Corollary 31. For every positive real number , there is an -DPshuffled protocol that computes histograms
on domains of size B with an expected `∞ error of at most O(logB log n), and where each user sends
O(B log n) messages each consisting of O(logB) bits.
The proof of Corollary 31 is very simple: we just run our (/2)-DP binary summation protocol for
each coordinate j ∈ B independently and attach to the message the coordinate index j (similar to our real
summation protocol). It is obvious to see that the number of messages and the message length are as claimed.
The `∞ error bound can be seen as follows. We claim that the probability that the `∞ error is more than
Cd logB = O(C logB log n) for any sufficiently large C is at most exp(−Ω(C)); this would immediately
imply the desired expected `∞ error bound stated in Corollary 31.
Now, to see that the probabilistic statement above is true, we first consider each coordinate separately.
Since each user picks from the “noise distribution” for this coordinate with probability p ≤ O(1/n), a
standard application of the Chernoff bound implies that the probability that the number of users picking from
the noise distribution for this coordinate exceeds C logB is at most exp(−Ω(C logB)) for any sufficiently
large C. When this event does not occur, the error for this coordinate is at most Cd logB. Taking a union
bound over all the coordinates yields the desired result.
We point out that using the Count Min sketch as in [MDC16, GGK+19] would allow us to reduce the per
user communication in Corollary 31 to O(n logB log n) messages each consisting of O(log n) bits, but further
reducing the communication down to O(poly(log n, logB)) bits remains a very interesting open question.
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B Missing Proofs from Section 3
B.1 Proof of Lemma 11
In this section we prove Lemma 11. We first recall some basic facts about unimodal random variables:
Definition 32 (Unimodal random variables). A random variable Z that takes values on {0, 1, . . . , D}, for
some positive integer D, is defined to be unimodal, if there is some k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , D} so that for j ≤ k, the
function j 7→ Pr[Z = j] is non-decreasing in j, and for j ≥ k, the function j 7→ Pr[Z = j] is non-increasing
in j. In such a case, k is said to be the mode of the distribution of Z.
Lemma 33. The distribution of Z1 + Z2 + · · · + Zm, where Z1, . . . , Zm ∼ ν = DLapd(d/2, s), is unimodal
with mode(s) given by {bmd/2c, dmd/2e}.
Proof. Unimodality of Z1 + · · · + Zm follows from log-concavity of DLapd(d/2, s) and the fact that log-
concave distributions are strongly unimodal, meaning that convolving with any unimodal distribution results
in another unimodal distribution [KG71, Theorem 3].
The fact that the mode is md/2 if m is even and that both bmd/2c, dmd/2e are modes if m is odd follows
by symmetry of DLapd(d/2, s).
Lemma 34. For any µ ∈ R, w, s > 1, we have
Cw(µ, s) ≤ C(µ, s) ≤ 2
1− e−1/s .
The proof of Lemma 34 is deferred to Section B.3.
Proof of Lemma 11. Lemma 16 gives
Pi+a,j+a( d−12 )
≥ Pa,a( d−12 ) · Pi,j , (52)
so it suffices to find a suitable lower bound on Pa,a( d−12 )
= PrZ1,...,Za∼ν
[
Z1 + · · ·+ Za = a
(
d−1
2
)]
. To do
so, note that for i ∈ {1, . . . , a}, E[Zi] = d/2, and write Z = Z1 + · · ·+ Za. By the Marcinkiewicz–Zygmund
inequality (Theorem 35) and the power mean inequality, we have
E [|Z − da/2|] ≥ 1
2
√
2
E
√√√√ a∑
i=1
(Zi − d/2)2

≥ 1
2
√
2a
E
[
a∑
i=1
|Zi − d/2|
]
≥
√
a
10
· s, (53)
The last inequality above follows since for Zi ∼ DLapd(d/2, s),
E[|Zi − d/2|] ≥ (s/2) · Pr[|Zi − d/2| ≥ s/2]
(using Lemma 34) ≥ (s/2) ·
(
1− (s/2) · 1
Cd(d/2, s)
)
(since 1− e−1/s ≤ 1/s ) ≥ (s/2) ·
(
1− (s/2) · 1− e
−1/s
2
)
≥ 3s/8.
Furthermore, we have
E[(Z − da/2)2] =
a∑
i=1
Var[Zi] ≤ 2as2. (54)
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As a result, we have
E[|Z − da/2| | |Z − da/2| ≥ s2] · Pr[|Z − da/2| ≥ s2]
≤ 1
s2
E[(Z − da/2)2 | |Z − da/2| ≥ s2] · Pr[|Z − da/2| ≥ s2]
(54)
≤ 1
s2
(2as2)
= 2a. (55)
Using inequality (55) above, we may upper bound E[|Z − da/2|] by
E[|Z − da/2|] ≤ a/2 + Pr[a/2 ≤ |Z − da/2| < s2] · s2 + 2a. (56)
Combining (53), (56), and a ≤ s2/1000 gives
Pr[a/2 ≤ |Z − da/2| < s2] ≥ s
√
a/10− 2.5a
s2
≥
√
a
20s
.
Finally, unimodality and symmetry of Z (Lemma 33) gives
Pa,a( d−12 )
= Pr
[
Z =
ad
2
− a
2
]
≥
√
a
40s3
,
which, combined with (52), completes the proof.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 34
Proof of Lemma 34. It is obvious to see that Cw(µ, s) ≤ C(µ, s). To bound the latter, recall that
C(µ, s) =
∞∑
z=−∞
e−|z−µ|/s ≤
bµc∑
z=−∞
e−(µ−z)/s +
∞∑
z=dµe
e−(z−µ)/s. (57)
Consider the second term on the right hand side. We have
∞∑
z=dµe
e−(z−µ)/s ≤
∞∑
i=0
e−i/s =
1
1− e−1/s .
Similarly, we also have
bµc∑
z=−∞
e−(µ−z)/s ≤
∞∑
i=0
e−i/s =
1
1− e−1/s .
Plugging the above two inequalities into (57), we get the desired bound.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 16
Proof of Lemma 16. We have
Pi+i,j+j′ =
∑
a∈Si+i′,j+j′
ν(a).
=
∑
a1,··· ,ai+i′∈Z∩[0,d]
a1+···+ai+i′=j+j′
ν(a1) · · · ν(ai+i′)
≥
∑
a1,··· ,ai+i′∈Z∩[0,d]
a1+···+ai=j and ai+1···+ai+i′=j′
ν(a1) · · · ν(ai+i′)
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= ∑
a1,··· ,ai∈Z∩[0,d]
a1+···+ai=j
ν(a1) · · · ν(ai)

 ∑
ai+1,··· ,ai+i′∈Z∩[0,d]
ai+1···+ai+i′=j′
ν(ai+1) · · · ν(ai+i′)

= Pi,j · Pi′,j′ .
C Proof of Theorem 23
In this section, we provide a self-contained proof of Theorem 23. Our proof use the following well-known
theorem, which provides an anti-concentration guarantee of a sum of independent random variables.
Theorem 35 (Marcinkiewicz-–Zygmund inequality). Let ξ1, . . . , ξn be any independent random variables
with mean zero and E [|ξi|] <∞. Then,
E
[∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
ξi
∣∣∣∣∣
]
≥ 1
2
√
2
· E
√√√√ n∑
i=1
ξ2i
 .
We can now prove Theorem 23. Our proof is similar to that of Chan et al. [CSS12]. The main difference is
that instead of defining the notion of “bad transcripts” explicitly as in [CSS12], we account of them implicitly
in our averaging argument.
Proof of Theorem 23. For convenience, let us denote by R0 and R1 the distributions of X0 and X1 respec-
tively. Assume that there is an analyzer that receives the messages from the users (without shuffling), where
the ith user with input bi samples Xi from Rbi and sends Xi to the analyzer, and output an estimate sum
with an expected error at most α. We will argue that SD(R0,R1) ≥ 1− Ω
(
α√
n
)
.
For each message sequence X1, . . . , Xn where Xi is the message from the ith user, we use A(X1, . . . , Xn)
to denote the analyzer’s estimate4 upon receiving these messages. For any input sequence b1, . . . , bn ∈ {0, 1},
the expected error is
EX1∼Rb1 ,...,Xn∼Rbn |A(X1, . . . , Xn)− (b1 + · · ·+ bn)| ,
which must be at most α due to our assumption.
Hence, by averaging over all sequences b1, . . . , bn ∈ {0, 1}, we have
α ≥ Eb1,...,bn∼{0,1}EX1∼Rb1 ,...,Xn∼Rbn |A(X1, . . . , Xn)− (b1 + · · ·+ bn)| .
Let us denote the quantity on the right hand side above by ERR. Furthermore, for each possible message
X ∈ supp(R0)∪ supp(R1), let us define the probability distribution FX on {0, 1} by FX(0) = R0(X)R0(X)+R1(X)
and FX(1) = R1(X)R0(X)+R1(X) . It is not hard to see that ERR can be rearranged as
ERR = EX1,...,Xn∼0.5R0+0.5R1Eb1∼FX1 ,...,bn∼FXn |A(X1, . . . , Xn)− (b1 + · · ·+ bn)| . (58)
Let us now bound the inner expectation as follows.
Eb1∼FX1 ,...,bn∼FXn |A(X1, . . . , Xn)− (b1 + · · ·+ bn)|
=
1
2
Eb1,b′1∼FX1 ,...,bn,b′n∼FXn [|A(X1, . . . , Xn)− (b1 + · · ·+ bn)|+ |A(X1, . . . , Xn)− (b′1 + · · ·+ b′n)|]
≥ 1
2
Eb1,b′1∼FX1 ,...,bn,b′n∼FXn |(b1 − b′1) + · · ·+ (bn − b′n)| , (59)
4Note that we may assume w.l.o.g. that the analyzer is deterministic.
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where the last line follows from triangle inequality. Now, observe that each (bi−b′i) is an independent random
variable such that
bi − b′i =

−1 with probability FXi(0)FXi(1),
0 with probability 1− 2FXi(0)FXi(1),
1 with probability FXi(0)FXi(1).
Hence, we may apply the Marcinkiewicz-–Zygmund inequality (Theorem 35), which gives
Eb1∼FX1 ,...,bn∼FXn |A(X1, . . . , Xn)− (b1 + · · ·+ bn)| ≥
1
4
√
2
· E
√√√√ n∑
i=1
(bi − b′i)2

(by power mean inequality) ≥ 1
4
√
2
· E
[∑n
i=1 |bi − b′i|√
n
]
(by the linearity of expectation) =
1
2
√
2n
·
n∑
i=1
FXi(0)FXi(1)
Plugging this back into (59) and using the linearity of expectation once again, we have
ERR ≥ EX1,...,Xn∼0.5R0+0.5R1
[
1
2
√
2n
·
n∑
i=1
FXi(0)FXi(1)
]
=
√
n
2
√
2
· EX∼0.5R0+0.5R1 [FX(0)FX(1)] . (60)
Finally, we relate the right hand side term with the total variation distance between R0 and R1 as follows.
EX∼0.5R0+0.5R1 [FX(0)FX(1)] =
∑
X
(0.5R0(X) + 0.5R1(X)) · 0.5R0(X)R0(X) +R1(X) ·
0.5R1(X)
R0(X) +R1(X)
=
∑
X
0.5
R0(X)R1(X)
R0(X) +R1(X)
≥
∑
X
0.25 min{R0(X),R1(X)}
= 0.25(1− SD(R0,R1)). (61)
Combining (60) and (61), we have ERR ≥
√
n
8
√
2
(1−SD(R0,R1)). Since ERR ≤ α, we must have SD(R0,R1) ≥
1−O
(
α√
n
)
as desired.
D Proof of Observation 29
Proof of Observation 29. Let `∗ be the smallest positive integer such that
∑
x∈aZ\(−`∗a,`∗a) ρs∗(x) ≤ e−δλ ·
ρs∗(aZ); such an integer exists because ρs∗(aZ) =
∑
x∈aZ ρs∗(x) <∞.
Consider any c ∈ R. Let q = bc/ac and r = c− qa. We may expand PrX∼DaZ,s∗,c [|X − c| > `∗a] as∑
x∈aZ\[c−`∗a,c+`∗a]
DaZ,s∗,c(x)
=
1
ρs∗,c(aZ)
 ∑
x∈aZ\[c−`∗a,c+`∗a]
ρs∗,c(x)

=
1
ρs∗,c(aZ)
 ∑
x∈aZ\[c−`∗a,c+`∗a]
ρs∗(x− c)

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=
1
ρs∗,c(aZ)
 ∑
x∈aZ
x<c−`∗a
ρs∗(x− c) +
∑
x∈aZ
x>c+`∗a
ρs∗(x− c)

≤ 1
ρs∗,c(aZ)
 ∑
x∈aZ
x<c−`∗a
ρs∗(x− (q − 1)a) +
∑
x∈aZ
x>c+`∗a
ρs∗(x− qa)

=
1
ρs∗,c(aZ)
 ∑
x∈aZ
x<c−(q−1)a−`∗a
ρs∗(x) +
∑
x∈aZ
x>c−qa+`∗a
ρs∗(x)

≤ 1
ρs∗,c(aZ)
 ∑
x∈aZ
x≤−`∗a
ρs∗(x) +
∑
x∈aZ
x≥`∗a
ρs∗(x)

=
1
ρs∗,c(aZ)
·
∑
x∈aZ\(−`∗a,`∗a)
ρs∗(x)
≤ ρs∗(aZ)e
−δλ
ρs∗,c(aZ)
,
where the last inequality follows from our choice of `∗. Finally, recall from Lemma 28 that ρs∗,c(aZ) ≥
e−δ · ρs∗(aZ). Plugging this back into the above inequality yields the desired claim.
38
